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ADVANCED FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM STUDY 
G.L. Hartmann; J.E. Wall, Jr.; and E.R. Rang* 
H.P. Lee; R.W. Schulte; and W.K. Ngt 
SUt-1HARY 
This study defines a new fly-by-wire flight control system architecture 
designed for high reliability. Spare sensor and computer elements are 
included to permit safe dispatch with failed elements, thereby reducing 
unscheduled maintenance. This program also formulated a methodology capable 
of demonstrating that the architecture does achieve the predicted performance 
characteristics. This methodology consists of a hierarchy of activities 
ranging from analytical calculations of system reliability and formal methods 
of software verification to iron bird testing followed by flight evaluation. 
This study concludes with a section on interfacing this architecture to the 
Lockheed S-3A aircraft for flight test. This testbed vehicle can be expanded 
to support flight experiments in advanced aerodynamics, electromechanical 
actuators, secondary power systems, flight management, new displays, and air 
traffic control concepts. 
SECTION l--INTRODUCTION 
1.1 OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS 
In broad terms, the objective of this program is twofold. One objective 
is to define a new fly-by-wire (FBW) flight control system architecture that 
possesses the integrity required by future commercial applications. Future 
energy-efficient aircraft will require: 
;Honeywell Systems and Research Center, Minneapolis, Minnesota. 
Lockheed California Company, Burbank, California. 
(1) Reliable digital FEW control 
(2) Electromechanical actuators 
(3) All-electric secondary power technology 
The redundant, self-checking architecture defined in this study achieves 
the first element and is compatible with developments in the second and third 
areas. A second objective of this program is to formulate a methodology 
capable of demonstrating that the architecture does achieve the required level 
of performance. This hierarchical methodology ranges from analytical 
calculations of theoretical system reliability and formal methods for 
verifying software to laboratory and iron bird tests and actual flight 
experiments. A commitment to the proposed level of structure and rigor will 
lead to a validatable flight control system. 
The definition of an advanced digital fly-by-wire (ADFBW) architecture is 
a technology integration task. State-of-the-art assessments and trends in the 
underlying computer, sensing, and actuation areas were used to select from a 
number of design alternatives. 
In later sections of this report, the Lockheed S-3A aircraft is discussed 
as a potential testbed vehicle. However, the ADFEW architecture was not 
developed specifically for the S-3A. A generic FBW system is assumed for an 
aircraft requiring three axes augmentation, gain scheduling based on air data 
measurements, and angle-of-attack limiting consistent with reduced static 
stability airframe designs. Therefore, a sensor suite will include pilot 
transducers, body rates and accelerations, and air data measurements. 
The pacing requirements for all FEW systems are the reliability-related 
qualities of flight safety, mission reliability, and availability. Numerous 
programs have developed redundancy structures for both military and commercial 
applications that satisfy flight safety and mission reliability through 
various combinations of triplex and quad redundancy, all of which produce at 
least dual-fail-operative performance. The failure rates of current 
components indicate the necessity for considerable unscheduled maintenance. 
For example, the mean-time-between-maintenance for flight control sensors plus 
electronics will be approximately 250 to 1000 operating hours, depending on 
system complexity and design maturity. In a commercial application with 2000 
hours every six months, a potential dispatch problem is evident. 
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The reliability of the advanced flight control system should be such that 
its loss would not be expected during the lifetime of a large commercial fleet 
, 
of aircraft using it. This requirement, when reduced to a probability of loss 
per flight hour, produces a figure on the order of 10-9• For example, 
assuming 10 flight hours per day produces 3600 hours per year per aircraft. A 
fleet of 200 aircraft operating for 15 years accumulates about 10 7 flight 
-9 hours. Allowing a 1% loss probability results in the 10 per hour figure. 
The desired maintenance quality implies fault tolerance in excess of that 
needed for flight safety. Various strategies are conceivable for achieving 
this. Since flight safety is of first priority, no aircraft will be 
dispatched if the flight control status is not adequate. Consequently, the 
maintenance requirements may be posed in terms of an allowed probability of 
unscheduled maintenance over a given period. For this study the period was 
defined as six months, or about 2000 hours for a commercial aircraft. If this 
probability is low, then the system maintenance quality is adequate. It seems 
reasonable that a large percentage of a commercial fleet should not require 
unscheduled maintenance over the stated period, perhaps 90%. If such a level 
were achieved (a six-month unscheduled maintenance probability of 0.1), a 
dramatic improvement in maintenance quality of current FB'~ systems would be 
realized. 
1.2 REPORT ORGANIZATION 
This report is organized in eight sections plus two appendixes. Section 
1 is the introduction. Section 2 presents the recommended architecture and 
implementation. section 3 starts the discussion of the validation methodology 
by addressing system and interface specifications. Section 4 presents a 
method of reliability prediction. Section 5 concentrates on the software 
development process. Section 6 concludes the validation methodology by 
addressing the system test phase. Section 7 presents the S-3A interface to 
the recommended architecture and discusses the interface to the electrical and 
hydraulic systems. Section 8 presents conclusions and recommends development 
and flight test of the ADFBW architecture. 
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SECTION 2--DEVELOPMENT OF AN ADVANCED ARCHITECTURE 
The ADFBW flight control architecture must exhibit ultra-reliability with 
low maintenance and must be validated and verified to a high degree of 
confidence. To achieve the ultra-reliability objective, redundant elements 
are used. The system must be able to tolerate multiple faults while 
maintaining undegraded operation. In designing this fault-tolerant system, 
reliability analysis plays a major role in the system architecture selection 
process. Section 2.1 summarizes design tradeoffs in terms of preliminary 
reliability and maintenance characteristics. A more detailed analysis of the 
recommended architecture is made using fault tree analysis in section 4. The 
generic ADFBW architecture is defined in section 2.2, based on our design 
objectives of ultra-reliability plus ease and confidence of validation. An 
implementation of the recommended architecture for the S-3A testbed is 
contained in section 2.3. 
2.1 RELIABILITY AND ~mINTAINABILITY ISSUES 
Advanced flight control architectures are built on advances in the 
underlying sensor, computer, and actuator technologies. Honeywell 
participated in a study of 1990 flight control technologies as part of a study 
of integrated application of active controls technology to an advanced 
4 
subsonic transport (ref. 1). In this study, we assessed the trends in the 
following technologies: 
(l) Sensors 
- rlir data 
- Angular rate 
- Accelerometers 
(2) Airborne computer technology 
- Instruction set and higher-order language trends 
- Integrated circuit advances 
- Buses (including fiber optics) 
(3) Design and validation 
- Flight control functions 
- Formal specifications 
- Software design and code 
- Verification and validation 
(4) Actuators 
- Hydraulic power sources 
- Electric power sources 
An in-depth treatment of this technology status and its trends may be found in 
reference 1. 
Several conclusions from this investigation are pertinent to the design 
of an ADFBW architecture. Hardware improvements will not remove the need for 
sensor redundancy. Reliable sensing can be achieved through sensor redundancy 
and an increased use of the computer system. Present aircraft actuation 
systems use redundant hydraulic elements to achieve sufficient reliability for 
FBW requirements. New actuator developments are aimed at improving efficiency 
through the use of electromechanical actuators. The ADFBW architecture must 
be compatible with both types of actuation systems. Significant advances in 
computer hardware are expected through developments in large-scale integrated 
circuit technology. Software costs are expected to continue to dominate 
hardware costs in DOD/NASA applications. This trend emphasizes the need to 
carefully trade off whether a particular system function is to be performed in 
hardware, software, or some combination of both. 
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The reliability of typical components for a flight control system is 
shown in table 1. These values are projected for the mid-1980's. A single 
string of sensors, computer, and hydraulic actuator--as illustrated in figure 
l--has a mean time between failures (MTBF) of approximately 1500 hours, orders 
of magnitude less than our requirement. Hence, replication of sensing, 
computing, and actuation elements is mandatory. 
Next consider a triple set of these elements and assume that the 
redundancy management allows operation with only one of the three channels 
functional. If there is no crossfeeding of sensor and computer to the 
-9 . 
actuation, the unreliability is about 0.28 x 10 at one hour correspondlng 
to failure of the three channels. If the redundant elements are fully 
crossfed, the number of success paths increases. In this case the 
unreliability decreases by more than a factor of 20 to 0.013 x 10-9 at one 
hour. These trends are shown in figure 2, which illustrates that redundant 
elements with crossfeeds improve overall system reliability. 
TABLE 1. - RELIABILITY CHARACTERISTICS OF FLIGHT CONTROL ELEMENTS 
Element 
Air Data Computer 
Pilot Transducers 
Rate Gyros 
Accelerometers 
Serial Data Buses 
Computer 
Actuator 
Failure Rate Comments 
(x 10-6) 
91. Three-year extrapolation of 
existing products 
40. Pitch, roll, yaw sensors* plus 
AID electronics 
30. State of the art 
30. Precision floated pendulum 
or quartz fiber 
10. 
200. 
90.-140. 
Estimate based on chip count 
Estimate of self-checking 
microprocessor 
Based on state-of-the-art (includes 
electronic and hydraulic components) 
*These position sensors could be a linear variable differential transformer 
(LVDT) • 
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Sufficient redundancy must be provided to meet both the flight safety 
requirement and the low maintenance goal. As explained in section I, the goal 
of 10lv maintenance is taken to mean that the probability or unscheduled 
maintenance is less than 10% over 2000 flight hours. Thus, two distinct 
reliability issues enter the design process: 
o Probability of catastrophic failure «10-9/hr ) 
o Probability of unscheduled maintenance «0.1/2000 hrs) 
Both probabilities impact the recommended architecture. 
For design purposes, it is useful to apportion these two probabilities 
among the various components of the flight control system. This is somewhat 
analogous to the well-known error budgeting process. The probability of 
catastrophic failure is apportioned roughly evenly between the sensor suite, 
computers, and actuators. For the sensors, this probability is further broken 
down into contributions from air data computers, pilot transducers, and 
inertial sensors. The probability of unscheduled maintenance is about evenly 
divided between sensors and computers. This is because it was impractical to 
reduce the probability of unscheduled maintenance for the actuators to near 
10% per 2000 hours. 
The next sections will summarize the design decisions in the organization 
of the redundant sensing, computing, and actuation elements. In selecting the 
recommended architecture from the various design alternatives, experience with 
other systems and interpretation of the technology trends play a large role in 
weighting the benefits of one approach against another. 
2.2 RECOMMENDED ARCHITECTURE 
2.2.1 Overview 
The recommended flight control system architecture is shown in figure 3. 
This advanced, self-checking architecture is capable of meeting the 
flight-critical safety requirements and the goal of low system maintenance. 
Further, the proposed structure facilitates verification and validation of the 
system's performance. 
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The baseline suite of sensors consists of six sets of pilot input 
transducers, six air data computers, and three skewed triads of inertial 
sensors. Spare sensors are treated as cold spares and reconfigured only 
during preflight. The sensors interface with the computer channels via six 
serial sensor buses. Six parallel computer channels of self-checking 
microprocessor pairs are proposed. Spare processors operate as hot spares. 
The bus controller for each sensor bus is included within a computer channel. 
The computers broadcast over redundant command buses to triplex servo 
terminals. The number of such triplex servo terminals is dependent on the 
specific application. The remote terminals are compatible with either 
conventional hydraulically powered actuators or electromechanical actuators. 
The following subsections provide more detail on the individual elements 
of this architecture: 
Sensors 
computers 
Actuators 
Figure 4 provides a summary of the total unreliability for the ADFBW 
architecture. This curve is obtained by summing the sensor, computer, and 
servo contributions and excludes electric and hydraulic power sources. The 
individual reliability characteristics are developed below. A more detailed 
analysis of reliability using fault tree modeling is presented in section 4. 
2.2.2 Sensors 
The basic control mode in this study requires pilot input transducers, 
body rates and accelerations, and air data. The initial assignment of sensor 
redundancy was made based on flight safety considerations. For pilot input 
and air data sensing, replication to the desired level of redundancy to permit 
dispatch with failed elements is required. For the rates and acceleration 
measurements, a skewed sensor assembly is recommended. 
Air data. - The air data computers provide angle of attack plus the usual 
air data derived quantities. Current production air data systems are expected 
to achieve, within three years, a MTBF of 11 000 hours. Hence, the failure 
-6 
rate is 91 x 10 per hour (table 1). 
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Estimates of the probability of loss of air data are used to decide the 
minimum level of redundancy for safe dispatch. Comparison monitoring is used 
to detect and isolate failures of the air data computers. With quad 
redundancy, a loss of air data occurs when three of the four units have 
failed. This probability is estimated as 
Q = (43) Q3 (1 - Q) 
air data 
-9 
= 0.048 x 10 (averaged over 4 hours) 
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This unreliability is plotted as a function of flight duration in figure 
5. A triplex system loses air data when two of three units fail, and this 
probability is too high. Therefore, the following requirement for safe 
dispatch is established: 
At least four air data computers must be operating for dispatch. 
Spare air data computers are supplied in order to satisfy the maintenance 
objective. Maintenance of the air data computers is required when the number 
of failed units exceeds the number of spares. The recommended architecture 
has six air data computers--that is, two spaces are provided. Maintenance is 
required when three of the six units fail preflight checks. The probability 
of this event is shown in figure 6. At 2000 flight hours, the probability of 
unscheduled maintenance on the air data computers is about 5%. 
Pilot input transducers. - The pilot input transducers include pitch and 
roll stick and pedal transducers. The transducers are LVDTs. The pilot input 
terminal includes the electronics for accepting three axes of commands, 
performing AID conversion, and interfacing with the sensor bus. Table 1 
-6 
shows the expected failure rate to be 40 x 10 per hour. 
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Figure 6. - Sensor maintenance trends. 
The self-test coverage of these devices is 100%. This means that 
operation with only one unit is possible. With a triplex system, the 
probability of loss of pilot sensors equals the probability of three failures 
out of three units. 
-12 
= 1.02 x 10 per hour (averaged over 4 hours) 
This probability is plotted in figure 5, and is negligible. The probability 
of loss of pilot sensors with only a dual system, however, is too great. This 
leads to the requirement that 
At least three pilot sensor terminals must be operating for dispatch. 
Once again, maintenance is required when the number of failed units 
exceeds the number of spares. With the six units included in the 
architecture, three spares are provided, and maintenance is required only 
after four failures. The probability of unscheduled maintenance on the pilot 
input transducers is plotted in figure 6 and is shown to be less than 1% after 
2000 hours. 
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Inertial sensors. - Body rate and acceleration measurements are required 
in three axes. The failure rate for each of these six sensors is 30 x 10- 6 
per hour (table 1). 
Comparison monitoring is used to detect and isolate failures of the 
inertial sensors. This scheme results in the loss of inertial sensing when 
all but one of the sensors of any type fail. For a quad-redundant system, the 
probability that three of four sensors fail is simply 
QIS = (~) Q3(1_Q) 
= 0.01 x 10-9 per hour (averaged over 4 hours) 
Figure 5 shows this reliability as a function of flight duration. A 
triplex system has an unacceptably large probability of loss of inertial 
sensing, so for safe dispatch we require that 
At least four inertial sensors of each of six types must be operating. 
The three components of figure 5 were combined to yield the sensor curve shown 
previously in figure 4. 
By providing two spares, maintenance is required when three sensors of any 
type have failed. The probability of this event is plotted in figure 6. A 2% 
probability of unscheduled maintenance for the inertial sensors occurs at 2000 
hours. This suite of gyros satisfies our reliability and sparing goals. 
However, it does involve a large number of sensors: 
Rate gyros: 
Accelerometers: 
3 axes x 6 = 18 total 
3 axes x 6 = 18 total 
In order to achieve some reduction in hardware, we recommend skewed 
sensors. Two skewed triads (six sensors) can provide dual-fail-operational 
capability. Three skewed triads provide sparing and can permit safe dispatch 
with up to three sensors failed. Basically, sparing is accomplished by 
configuring a hexad arrangement from the nine sensors as part of a preflight 
check. The two triads are oriented such that each axis of the triad makes an 
equal angle with the aircraft x-axis and no three axes of any set are 
co-planar. 
Skewed sensors are presently receiving increased attention (ref. 2, 3, 
and 4). Skewed sensors require higher resolution and dynamic range than 
conventional configurations and must avoid saturation. It is felt that gyro 
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and accelerometer technology has advanced such that the additional demands 
placed on sensors if they are skewed can be satisfied. Honeywell is currently 
working three major areas involving skewed sensor assemblies: 
(1) Multifunction control reference system. - This is an Air Force program 
to flight test on an F-lS hexad (two orthogonal triads) composed of six 
accel~rometers and six ring laser gyros. The "boxes" consisting of sensors 
plus computer are skewed (ref. 2 and 3). 
(2) Integrated sensor assembly. - This Navy program uses a different 
architecture. Five boxes are used--two for integrated sensor assemblies, 
three for flight computers. One computer is dedicated to the strapdown 
navigation computations; the other two perform flight control. In this 
architecture only the sensor assemblies are skewed. Flight test is planned on 
an F-14 or F-18. 
(3) Integrated inertial reference assembly. - This Air Force program is in 
a study phase with the objective of defining future skewed sensor requirements 
for the 1990's. 
with the commitment to skewed sensors in the aircraft community, we feel 
such a sensor approach is viable for our architecture and provides an elegant 
solution to the inertial sensor redundancy problem. 
Sensor redundancy management. - The redundancy management of the sensors 
is replicated in each digital channel. Each processor can independently 
detect and isolate sensor faults. During preflight, a sensor suite will be 
identified. Redundant sensors in excess of the dispatch requirements will be 
ignored. This eliminates the need for mid-value selecting from up to six 
signals. The redundancy levels required are: 
(1) Pilot transducer terminals 
- Three terminals 
(2) Air data computers 
- Four compares 
(3) Skewed gyros/accelerometers 
- Two triads 
The pilot input transducers and air data quantities use conventional 
comparison monitoring. Since the digital channels operate asynchronously, 
data skew between the signals being monitored is to be expected. This data 
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skew will result in a time delay (less than one-half the sampling period) for 
mid-value selected signals. Sampling rates will be selected so this delay 
does not compromise phase and gain margins. 
Management of the skewed sensors would be based on the use of parity 
equations (ref. 2). Parity equations take advantage of the fact that sensor 
skewing provides redundant information. Basically, the outputs of any four 
sensors may be linearly combined (via direction cosines that describe 
geometry) to form a parity equation. In the absence of sensor errors the 
parity equations equal zero. The number of parity equations available for 
sensor redundancy management is computed from N sensors taken four at a time. 
Thus, six sensors yield 15 parity equations. 
The multifunction control reference system skewed assembly is being 
applied to a high-performance fighter and the sensor triads have been 
separated to demonstrate the concept in a nworst-casen installation. Thus 
compensation for various moment-arm effects has been included to allow low 
decision thresholds. In addition, effort has been expended to tailor parity 
equations for real-time use (ref. 2). At each sample time, subsets of the 
parity equations are used based on a table look-up calculated from the failure 
status of the previous pass. This approach yields the following advantages: 
(1) Minimum processor usage (redundancy management decisions are computed 
off-line and stored in look-up tables) 
(2) Ability to deal with dual simultaneous failures 
(3) Noise immunity (via the use of trip levels) 
(4) Flexibility (look-up tables and trip levels are easily adjusted) 
(5) Two-level operation--acceptable sensitivity without false alarms 
(6) Decisions based on the status of all parity equations computed 
Skewed sensor technology has made significant progress. Our architecture 
will be able to integrate this technology to provide cost-effective sparing 
of the inertial information. 
2.2.3 Computers 
The recommended computer system consists of six redundant, parallel 
computer channels. Each channel is a self-checking microprocessor pair that 
implements all of the flight control modes. Each self-checking pair listens 
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to all the sensor data on each of the six sensor buses. Each channel 
independently performs sensor selection and control law computations. Each 
pair also transmits, on the sensor bus it controls, various integrator values 
for cross-channel equalization. This transmission is necessary because the 
six computer channels run asynchronously. The software to perform these 
functions is estimated to require a computer loading of less than 400 kops. 
The major design alternatives considered are: 
(1) Distributed processing with spares versus redundant channels 
performing identical tasks 
(2) Single or multiprocessor channels 
(3) Fault detection and isolation 
(4) The number of channels required to achieve high reliability and 
provide sparing for low maintenance 
Each of these areas is discussed below. 
The first design alternative involves options in defining a philosophy for 
managing the computers. Two options are: 
(1) A distributed system with an operating system that distributes tasks 
among healthy processors. This approach requires the distributed system to 
reconfigure to remove failed processors. Examples of such systems are given 
in references 5 and 6. 
(2) A fixed tasking structure with a planned fallback to redundant copies 
of tasks running in parallel in separate processors. This option uses 
redundant channels of computers. Many current systems are implemented in this 
manner. 
The second option is a simpler alternative. Its software is far less 
complicated and its operation in response to failures is easier to verify. 
This alternative must be favored in an architecture seeking ultra-reliability 
and complete validation, particularly if the redundant channels are single 
processors. 
The second design issue is whether a channel should be implemented as 
single or multiple processors. We believe that valid software can be produced 
for either arrangement by proper definition of software modules and control of 
their interfaces. Historically, problems arise when the processors start to 
become heavily loaded and modules are compromised to "fit everything in." We 
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have estimated the software load for a generic FEW system, and have concluded 
that with advanced microprocessor technology, a single processor will be less 
than 50% loaded. In addition, our architecture has been defined to eliminate 
and simplify software, especially in the redundancy management functions. 
Thus, we are led to recommend the simple alternative of performing all the 
computations in a single processor. As will be explained in the next section, 
the selected processor is readily expandable to a multiple processor 
configuration should the throughput requirements grow. 
The next issue involves the fault-tolerant operation of the multichannels. 
The two major design alternatives are majority voting and self-test. Either 
option may be implemented in a hardware-intensive or software-intensive 
fashion. To date, most redundant flight control computers have used voting to 
detect first faults, since software self-test of processors has never claimed 
100% coverage. 
In past designs some computers have used duplication of key circuits as a 
way of providing self-test. with today's microprocesor technology it is 
attractive to duplicate single-chip processors to provide complete coverage. 
We have been developing such an approach for the Air Force since 1978 (ref. 
7). The self-checking microprocessor pair (SCMP) is a processor with 100% 
self-test via hardware duplication at the integrated circuit (IC) level. 
Various tradeoffs have determined that if a SCMP fails, it should be removed 
from the system. No attempt is made to identify the healthy half and pair it 
with a spare processor to form a new SCMP. The latter option is possible, but 
was found to compromise the simplicity of the SCMP design. We recommend 
self-test as implemented in the SCMP. 
The remaining design issue concerns the number of parallel channels needed 
to satisfy reliability and low maintenance demands. Figure 7 shows a plot of 
the failure probability of a triple-channel configuration of SCMPs. This 
curve appeared previously in figure 4. This arrangement is dual 
fail-operational and allows operation with one digital channel. The 
probability that the three digital channels fail is less than 0.13 x 10- 9 
per hour (averaged over a four-hour flight). For safe dispatch, we impose the 
following requirement: 
That at least three SCMPs must be operating. 
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Figure 7 also shows the unreliability of the F-8 digital system and the F-8 
FBW system (digital plus analog backup). The ADFBW offers a significant 
improvement by virtue of MTBF advances due to very high-speed integrated 
circuit (VHSIC) technology and by permitting single-channel digital operation 
due to self-checking hardware. 
Maintenance trends are shown in figure 8, which compares maintenance 
probabilities if first failures must be fixed. Curves for computers with a 
HTBF of 1450 hours (F-8 DFBW) and 5000 hours (SCMP) are shown. If three spare 
SCMPs are provided, then maintenance is required after the fourth failure 
rather than the first. In this recommended situation, the probability of 
unscheduled maintenance for the computers is less than 8% for 2000 hours of 
operating time. 
2.2.4 Actuators 
This subsection defines the elements of the architecture that interface 
the computers to the surfaces. Present aircraft have a hydraulic power 
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Figure 8. - Maintenance trends in digital channels. 
generation and distribution system that has evolved over many design cycles. 
It is reliable and relatively easy to maintain. We recognize, however, that 
the long-term trend will be to use electromechanical actuators for energy 
efficiency. At this time, electromechanical actuators are not sufficiently 
mature to be considered for the ADFBW architecture. The proposed 
implementation uses conventional hydraulically powered actuators. 
There are advantages in defining a simple, clean interface between the 
digital channels and the servo electronics. Our recommendation is to use a 
remote terminal that provides this interface via a digital serial bus. The 
remote terminal can provide all the redundancy management and reconfiguration 
required of the servos. This simplifies the computer software since it is not 
involved in the servo loop closing or redundancy management. The remote 
terminal can be simply specified, built, and tested. The remote terminal 
commands surface position and provides the loop closure for each servo 
actuator. Details of the remote terminal are given in section 2.3. 
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For this application triple-servo channels and actuators are used. This 
is consistent with our baseline testbed, the S-3A. Servo monitoring is 
provided to allow operation down to one channel. The projected unreliability 
for a triple-servo channel was plotted previously in figure 4 as one of the 
components of the ADFBW reliability. The assumed failure rate includes both 
electronic and hydraulic components (table 1). The failure probability is 
-9 0.22 x 10 per hour (averaged over a four-hour flight). Thus, it is not 
safe to dispatch with a failed servo channel and obtain a failure rate less 
-9 than 10 per hour. 
Maintenance actions are required after a first failure. This yields the 
probability of unscheduled maintenance shown in figure 9. A range of 
probabilities is shown for a triple channel with a servo-channel MTBF between 
7140 hours and 11 000 hours. If a fourth servo channel were provided such 
that maintenance occurs after the second failure, there is still a 60% 
probability of unscheduled maintenance over 2000 operating hours. The servo 
channel MTBF would have to improve by another factor of three to 33 000 hours 
before the probability of unscheduled maintenance approaches 10%. Based on 
the cost and difficulty of replicating hydraulic actuation of the various 
surfaces, a triplex arrangement is recommended. 
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2.3 RECOMMENDED IMPLEMENTATION 
The key features of the recommended advanced, self-checking architecture are: 
(1) Skewed gyro/accelerometer sensor assemblies 
(2) Redundant serial buses to provide all sensor data to each computer 
(3) Redundant, self-checking microprocessor pairs 
(4) Serial command buses to remote terminals 
(5) Remote terminals to provide command distribution and redundancy 
management of each hydraulic servo actuator 
This section provides details on a recommended implementation of this 
architecture for the S-3A. Particular attention is given to the servo remote 
terminal as an illustration of self-checking approaches and the overall design 
methodology of section 3. This section emphasizes the key features and does 
not go into detail on preflight testing and other built-in tests that would be 
a part of the final detailed design. 
2.3.1 Sensors 
Six pilot input terminals and air data computers are included in the 
architecture. The proposed implementation uses standard LVDTs and air data 
computers. Each terminal and air data computer interfaces with one of the six 
sensor buses. 
The body rate and· acceleration mesurements are derived from three skewed 
triads. The individual sensor data in these triads will appear on redundant 
buses to reduce the effects of bus failures. For example, each sensor could 
be read out on four of the six buses. 
The rate gyro is a Honeywell-developed ring laser gyro. The laser gyro 
output is a 9600 Hz digital signal consisting of a string of pulses, each 
representing an increment of integrated aircraft angular rate. These pulses 
are summed in an accumulator to provide angular displacement over the 
preceding 0.02-second sample interval. This quantity is converted to a signal 
proportional to angular rate. 
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The accelerometers will also be high-quality instruments, compatible with 
skewing requirements. Candidates include either floated pendulum devices 
(Sundstrand QA 2000, Donner 4852) or quartz fiber devices (like Honeywell's 
GG326) . 
Serial data bus. - Six independent serial buses were shown in figure 3. 
The bus controller logic is packaged with the digital computers. However, it 
will continue to manage the bus after a SCMP fails. A 1553B type of protocol 
has been assumed, whereby the sensors supply data in a command/response mode. 
There are some advantages in using 1553B since it is a standard, and several 
manufacturers are offering chip sets that provide the interface. These 
hardware elements permit a high degree of redundacy without an inordinate 
hardware (size, weight, power) penalty. 
A recommendation to use wire or fiber-optic buses has not been made. 
Ultimately, fiber optics will be used. It may be appropriate to use wire in 
earlier phases. 
2.3.2 Computers 
This architecture has been built around SCMPs. Six channels of SCMPs run 
asynchronously. For protection from hazards, they should be packaged as two 
channels per 1/2 ATR box. We have identified the Fairchild 1750A as the 
leading candidate microprocessor. This selection is based on several 
considerations: 
(1) In view of today's processors, the Fairchild 1750A offers a dramatic 
improvement in throughput. This offers the opportunity to do all the flight 
control software in a higher-order language (HOL) in a single processor and 
still have room to grow. Its availability is consistent with the schedule of 
this program. 
(2) 1750A is an Air Force standard, and may evolve to the Joint Services 
standard for 16-bit machines. By virtue of its being a standard, there is a 
commitment to the development of extensive support tools, maintenance of a 
HOL, etc. In contrast, NASA developed its own HOL for Shuttle, and as the 
only user has had to provide all the maintenance and compiler upgrades. 
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The Fairchild l750A is a 3-micron, isoplanar integrated injection logic 
(I3L) device, based on the Fairchild 9445. Its characteristics are 
summarized in table 2. The logic symbol showing the pins and their functions 
is shown in figure 10, taken from reference 8. 
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TABLE 2. - FAIRCHILD 1750A CPU FEATURES 
o Single 64-pin microprocessor implements MIL-STD-1750A instruction set 
architecture 
o High-performance over military temperature range (200 nsec add: 1.8 wsec 
16 x 16 multiply; 970 kips DAIS mix:* 1.5 mips DAIS mix) 
o Single- and double-precision arithmetic (16 and 32 bits--16 
general-purpose registers) 
o 32- and 48-bit floating point arithmetic implemented on-chip 
o Real-time processing with 16 levels of interrupt vectors, direct memory 
access, 128 input/output channels, and two programmable timers 
o Directly addresses 64K words; extendable to 1M words with memory 
management unit 
o Extensive fault detection and debugging capability with microcoded console 
support and self-test 
o I 3L-II (3-micron) technology with 10 5 radiation tolerance 
o Static operation with clock frequency 0-20 MHz 
o Low-power' Schottky input/output with multiprocessing capabilities 
o Single SV supply (additional injector current source required): power 
dissipation 2.5W 
o Uses existing F9445 support circuits 
*DAIS Mix is an Air Force specified set of instructions. 
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Trends in microprocessor throughput are shown in figure 11. The 1750A 
throughput for an Air Force specified instruction mix (including floating 
point) is 970 kops. This is comfortably in excess of flight control 
requirements (estimated as no more than 400 kops). 
In addition to the Fairchild l750A, other VHSIC programs are directed at 
the l750A standard instruction set and will provide upgrades to our 
architecture. 
Software development. - It is important to use a HOL for developing 
software. At present, the l750A is supported by JOVIAL-J73. Our compiler was 
written in FORTRAN and developed by Software Engineering Associates under Air 
Force Avionics Laboratory Sponsorship. The compiler is presently hosted on 
IBM 360/370 computers. 
JOVTI\L is considered an interim language as the 000 makes the transition 
to Ada. Effective use of Ada requires an Ada Programming Support (APS) 
environment. Such tools are in development, but may require several years of 
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Figure 11. - Sixteen-bit microprocessor comparison. 
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effort. A hard look at using Ada as the HOL is recommended. It is felt that 
a significant contribution could be made by applying Ada to a real-time, 
ultra-reliable system. 
2.3.3 Actuators 
Triplex servo channels are employed for each control surface--rudder, 
aileron, and elevator. The servo interface uses a remote terminal, as shown 
previously in figure 3. The number of such remote servo terminals will depend 
on the particular application. For the S-3A, a mid-fuselage location for the 
ailerons and an aft terminal for the rudder and elevator seem appropriate. 
The basic overall function of the remote terminal is to select a suitable 
signal from six or less computer channels and drive the surface accordingly. 
A detailed functional specification for the remote terminal is given in 
section 3.3 as an illustration of the design methodology. This paragraph 
summarizes those specifications. The terminal must receive and interpret 
serial digital transmissions from the computer channels. It must compute the 
control command for the electro-hydraulic servo valve (EHSV). This command 
must be sent to the servo amplifier and monitored. The remote terminal also 
must monitor each actuator channel. 
This section presents some implementation details on a servo terminal that 
accomplishes these functions. The recommended implementation has three 
self-checking servo channels. Associated with each channel is self-testing 
health monitoring logic, which disengages the channel when a failure occurs. 
The health monitor sends back a discrete to the control panel for status 
monitoring. The three channels operate in an active/on-line mode. These 
features are discussed below. 
One channel of basic servo electronics and actuation is shown in figure 
12. Six serial buses from the self-checking computers are optically isolated 
and enter the multiplex chip. Anyone of the six received digital commands 
can be converted and used. The particular input that is used depends on the 
address generated by the priority encoder. The selected input goes to the 
receiver (UART) , the D/A, and the servo amp. The receiver contains a time-out 
feature such that if no message is received on the priority digital channel, a 
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predetermined alternate is used. The servo amp provides an analog signal that 
positions the EHSV. This valve controls the flow of hydraulic fluid to 
position the cylinder connected to the surface. 
Active/on-line control. - Any single servo channel is sufficient to 
position the surface. As shown in figure 12, all engaged cylinders are 
force-summed to drive the surface. Active/on-line control is a mechanism to 
relieve the force fight among the force-summed cylinders. One cylinder is in 
control of the surface position, or active, while the other engaged cylinders 
are on-line. 
Ideally, the several actuation channels could operate in concert with one 
another in an each-channel-active configuration. However, because of the 
high-pressure gain characteristics of actuator valves, small tolerances in the 
actuator control loops would lead to significant force opposition between 
channels. 
Maximum actuator capability force opposition could occur over a small 
deflection either side of the commanded position. No precise control 
capability exists while maximum force opposition is occurring. A hysteresis 
type of nonlinearity would be observed when the actuator command is cycled 
back and forth. 
The pressure feedback path in the on-line channels must overcome this 
force-fight tendency by driving the on-line actuators towards a zero force 
output condition under normal operating conditions. A limiter is provided in 
the pressure feedback path, as shown in figure 12. This limiter is set at a 
value such that the pressure feedback signal can slightly exceed the maximum 
tolerance between channels. Based on prior studies, the maximum tolerance 
between channels of actuation was estimated to be 2.8 rnA when + 8 rnA 
full-scale valves were considered. A pressure feedback limit equivalent to +4 
rnA was selected for the on-line actuator. The 4 rnA limit would be exceeded 
for 1/2 percent of full travel errant motion, after which the on-line actuator 
channel will oppose the motion. 
Thus the pressure feedback is effective in allowing the output actuators 
to operate in harmony with one another. However, the on-line actuator (or 
actuators) will oppose any active channel malfunction. 
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Upon detection of any failure in the active channel by the monitor, one of 
the on-line channels will be switched to the active status as the 
malfunctioning channel is bypassed. 
Active or on-line status for all healthy servo channels is assigned on the 
basis of the channel health monitor signals. If a channel is bypassed, active 
and on-line have no meaning. Table 3 shows a logic table description of servo 
channel status as a function of failure status. This table reduces to the 
following simple boolean functions, which can be implemented in hardware: 
A Active = A Eng 
B Active = A Eng • B Eng 
C Active = A Eng . B Eng • C Eng 
Because of the limiting of the !::.P signal, assignment of active or on-line 
status is not critical. The "two active" and "none active" states are not 
flight-critical, so this logic is not required to be redundant. There is a 
slight preference to have failure modes set more than one channel active 
(force fight) in the event of a malfunction of the logic. 
TABLE 3. - ACTIVE ON-LINE LOGIC 
Condition Servo Channel Status 
A B C Active On-Line Bypassed 
No Failures OK OK OK A B,C None 
F OK OK B C A 
First Failures OK F OK A e B 
OK OK F A B C 
OK F F A - B,C 
Second Failures F OK F B - A,e 
F F OK C - A,B 
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Self-checking health monitor. - The channel health monitor is responsible 
for detecting single errors in the channel and cutting off the channel (by the 
engage/bypass valve) if an error is detected. Once the engage/bypass valve is 
in the bypass position, it remains so unless there is a master system reset 
(probably a manual action). Therefore, it is sufficient for the channel 
health monitor to be able to detect only single failures in an unbypassed 
servo set. Multiple simultaneous failures are too improbable to consider. 
The bypass action clears each failure as it is detected. 
It is essential that the channel health monitor be self-testing, though 
not necessarily failure-operational. This means that if there is a single 
fault in the channel health monitor logic, it is detected and forces the 
engage/bypass valve to the bypass position. Thus a servo channel is removed 
whenever a fault is detected in the channel or the channel health monitor. 
With three redundant channels, failures in up to two channels can be 
tolerated, thus satisfying the primary requirement of the servo actuator 
system. 
The complete diagram of one servo channel is shown in figure 13. This 
figure adds the self-checking electronics and health monitor to the 
electronics and valves of figure 12. The path from the computer command to 
EHSV position is checked by a parallel path consisting of a redundant 
multiplexer and D/A chip and a model of the servo amp and valve. Note that 
the servo amp input includes a 6P signal that does not appear as an input to 
the model since this signal is not involved in positioning the EHSV. The 
cylinder position, EHSV spool position, and ~p measurements are made by 
LVDTs. These signals are monitored by validity discretes. If the measured 
EHSV position compares with the model prediction, and if the LVDTS are valid, 
the health monitor decides the servo channel is healthy and should be 
engaged. If the channel is not healthy, the monitor bypasses the channel. 
This is affected through a solenoid-held engage/bypass valve that controls the 
status of the cylinder. 
An example design of the channel health monitor is shown in figure 14. 
The hardware is duplicated in one-out-of-two codes in order to detect all 
single faults and all multiple undirectional faults (e.g., due to power 
loss). The engage/bypass valve is engaged only when the two signals Channel 
OK and Channel Fail are respectively 1 and O. In all other cases (11, 01, and 
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00) the valve should be disengaged. This logic function can be realized, as 
shown in figure 14, by putting two electromechanical relay switches in 
series. When the signals Channel OK and Channel Fail are respectively logic 1 
and 0, both the switches are closed and current flows in the solenoid, keeping 
the engage/bypass valve in the engage position. For all other values of these 
signals, at least one switch will be open, causing the valve to go to the 
bypass position. The switch SM is a mechanical switch directly controlled by 
the position of the engage/bypass valve. It is open when the valve is in 
bypass position. 
This example is presented to illustrate that self-testing mechanisms can 
be realized using simple coding techniques such as the one-out-of-two code. 
The necessary logic and coding functions can be achieved using any appropriate 
combination of digital electronics, analog electronics, electromechanical 
hardware, or mechanical hardware. Several design solutions exist. The actual 
solution to be used will depend on the detailed design tradeoffs, reliability 
of components, and requirements/constraints of a particular system. using a 
coding technique allows the design of mechanisms that can test single 
failures, multiple undirectional failures, loss of power, open circuits, etc. 
Thus, the channel monitor/engage circuit can be implemented as a fault-secure 
circuit with the preferred failure state being a bypassed channel. 
This completes the description of the recommended implementation. This 
implementation is compatible with use of the S-3A as a testbed and is based on 
components that could be available for flight test in the mid-1980's. The 
architecture could be implemented with other components and can assimilate 
upgraded processors, new sensors, or electromechanical actuators. A 
methodology for validating this architecture is detailed in the following 
sections. 
SECTION 3--SYSTEM SPECIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
Methodologies for the design and verification of general software systems 
have received much attention (ref. 9). There are heavy economic incentives 
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for reliability and maintainability. For flight controls, safety is the 
issue. The spectre of a single software error shutting down a multichannel 
redundant system haunts the avionics industry. \ve claim that this chimera 
should be banished for current synchronized-channel architectures (ref. 10) 
and certainly for the self-checking channel architecture described in the 
previous section. This confidence is not gained without cost. The system and 
its software must be designed to have simple, auditable, and testable 
structures. The reviews and tests must be done with a discipline that only 
the ultimate flight test can inspire. This section and sections 4 through 6 
present a methodology for achieving and demonstrating this level of 
performance. 
This section discusses the system specification and the definition of the 
hardware/software interface. Our methodology suggests an approach to making 
the system specification precise and complete (ref. 11), then adds more detail 
to describe the hardware/software interface (ref. 12). The ADFBW remote 
terminal is used as an example to conclude this section. 
Section 4 addresses system reliability. Techniques for predicting 
reliability are recommended. The fault tree approach described is applied to 
the ADFBW architecture defined in section 2. Laboratory methods for 
validating reliability predictions conclude section 4. 
Section 5 is concerned with software design and validation. It is noted 
that software is a paper business--a structure must be imposed. Suggestions 
for preparing the software specifications and designing, coding, and testing 
the software are given. 
Section 6 considers the analysis and testing of the integrated system. 
Techniques for identifying test cases are presented. It is shown that much of 
this work can be automated to provide rapid and complete reviews of the 
performance and establish the correctness of the hardware and software. 
3.1 METHODOLOGY OVERVIEW 
An overview of the methodology proposed for developing the ADFBW system is 
shown in figure 15. This methodology is not novel; much of it is current 
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Figure 15. - Methodology overview. 
practice. The methodology provides two key attributes of a successful 
development cycle: 
(1) The cycle has a series of definable phases 
(2) Each phase has unique, measurable outputs 
The methodology presented in figure 15 requires the following activities: 
System requirements review 
Software requirements review 
Preliminary design review 
Software functional design review 
Module code review 
Module tests 
Integration tests 
Preliminary qualification tests 
Formal qualification tests 
These activities audit the transmission of the system requirements from the 
customer to the contractor, the translation of the customer requirements into 
system specifications, the extraction of software specifications into 
functional modules, the definition of hardware/software interfaces, and the 
further elaboration of detailed software design and testing. The first three 
phases relate to establishing the system requirements, hardware/software 
interface, and software requirements. They are outlined below. The remaining 
items, concerning the design and test of the software, are the subject of 
section 5. 
Figure 15 shows typical documents produced in each phase. Most of these 
documents are used in the next step of the cycle. In addition, each phase 
requires some support functions (reviews) that need attention. Finally, 
various feedback paths (not shown) exist at each phase to resolve problems. 
The reviews at each step of the process are intended to remove errors at the 
most cost-effective level. 
Since there is much experience in the design and coding of flight control 
software, there is confidence that the test and reviews will detect any errors. 
37 
3.1.1 System Requirements 
This phase is conducted to determine the degree of completion of the 
concept definition, to review changes authorized by the customer, and to 
provide the details and background for preparing the system specifications. 
The requirements review provides an opportunity to impress on the customer 
that changes are expensive and that they should not be requested casually or 
capriciously. 
3.1.2 Description of the Hardware/Software Interface 
We recommend that the system be specified to the detail of identifying 
states, transitions, and inputs/outputs for all flight control functions 
abstractly without regard to hardware or software mechanizations. Of course, 
the allocation of functions between hardware and software is largely 
determined for the particular architecture, and from experience with similar 
systems. The object here is to add details and to make the description of the 
hardware/software interface complete and precise. After the interface has 
been defined, the software specifications are written. Sometimes a formal 
hardware specification is also prepared. The verification step must show that 
a system operating according to the hardware and software descriptions 
fulfills the original system specifications. 
3.1.3 Software Requirements 
The software specifications are written from the system specifications and 
the allocation of functions to hardware or software implementation. This 
defines the hardware/software interface. The software requirements review is 
informal; it will be conducted early in the program to ensure that the 
requirements are complete, necessary, and consistent. An informal 
demonstration will be made to show that the software as specified, plus the 
hardware functions, will fulfill the system specifications. 
To summarize, it is our position that the knowledge and techniques exist 
to produce a validatable flight control system. The process requires a 
commitment of resources and the discipline to succeed. There are many 
historical differences in hardware and software development practices, as 
illustrated in table 4. Our proposed methodology imposes the same level of 
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TABLE 4. - HISTORICAL DIFFERENCES IN HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 
DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES 
o Hardware proofs requirements with breadboards 
--Software typically attempts one continuous development 
o Hardware requirements "freeze" prior to build 
--Software often tolerates requirements changes throughout design, 
coding, and checkout 
o Hardware makes design review compulsory 
--Software has loosely defined design review points 
o Hardware uses firm test procedures 
--Software often debugs by engineering judgment 
o Hardware uses standard parts 
--Software is largely new sequences of computer instructions 
o Hardware is built from prints 
--Software generally has less detail provided at the design stage 
The programmer has near-infinite variation available in 
implementing the design 
structure and rigor on software as has evolved in the hardware area. This is 
the key to successfully developing flight-critical computer systems. 
3.2 SYSTEM SPECIFICATIONS 
Many studies have shown that precise and complete specifications return, 
many times over, the investment in their preparation. The terms 
"requirements" and "specifications" are not completely defined. We generally 
use requirements to mean the informal statements about the functions and 
performance of a system. These are prepared by the customer and are often not 
precise or complete. The specifications, or requirements specification, are 
the documents that try to outline the requirements in a more formal manner. 
These must be as complete and precise as needed to ensure the success of a 
project. Indeed, many errors are made in obtaining the correct description of 
what a system is supposed to do. The final validation of a system returns to 
these specifications. 
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In converting from requirements to specifications, there are varying 
degrees of formality. These range from formal languages like SRI's SPECIAL 
(ref. 13) to documents prepared according to various military standards (ref. 
14) • 
3.2.1 Current Specifications 
Many engineering projects use one of the military standards as a guide in 
writing specifications. The major shortcomings in following military 
standards are that some items may be omitted. There are no procedures to 
enforce completeness. In addition, the description of functions is left 
open. In this section specifications following NRL guidelines (ref. 15 and 
16) and MIL-STD-483 are reviewed. Recommendations are made for specifying the 
various flight control functions. Finite-state machines are shown to be 
useful for describing mode switching, signal selection, and failure management 
functions. 
To understand the limitations MIL-STD-483 imposes, the specifications for 
the NASA Demonstration Advanced Avionics System (DAAS) flight controls were 
written in the two styles (ref. 16) of MIL-STD-483 and the Naval Research 
Laboratory (ref. 17). The NRL style included the use of finite-state machines 
to specify the control modes. 
The organization of the NRL specification is shown in table 5. The NRL 
suggests that we should: 
(1) Specify only external behavior without implying a particular 
implementation. 
(2) Specify constraints on the implementation, especially the details of 
the hardware interfaces. 
(3) Write the document so that it is easy to change and may be kept 
current throughout the life cycle of the system; also so that it will serve 
as a reference to answer specific questions quickly, rather than to explain in 
general what the program does. 
(4) Record forethought about the life cycle of the system, particularly to 
anticipate and facilitate later changes. 
(5) Characterize acceptable responses to undesired events and not leave 
this to invention by the programmer. 
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TABLE 5. - ORGANIZATION OF AN NRL SPECIFICATION 
Introduction 
Computer Characteristics 
Hardware Interfaces 
Software Functions 
Timing Constraints 
Accuracy Constraints 
Response to Undesired 
Events 
Subsets 
Fundamental Assumptions 
Changes 
Glossary 
Sources 
Organization principles, abstracts for 
other sections, notation guide 
If the computer is predetermined, a general 
description with particular attention to its 
idiosynchrasies: otherwise, a summary of its 
required characteristics 
Concise description of information received 
or transmitted by the computer 
What the software must do to meet its 
requirements, in various situations and in 
response to various events 
How often and how fast each function must 
be performed: this section is separate from 
section 3 because "what" and "when" can 
change independently 
How close output values must be to ideal 
values to be acceptable 
What the software must do if sensors go 
down, the pilot keys in invalid data, etc 
What the program should do if it cannot 
do everything 
The characteristics of the program that will 
stay the same, no matter what changes are made 
The types of changes that have been made or 
are expected 
All documentation is fraught with acronyms 
and technical terms. At first we prepared 
this guide for ourselves; as we learned the 
language, we retained it for newcomers 
Annotated list of documentation and 
personnel, indicating the types of questions 
each can answer 
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(6) Formulate questions before trying to answer them. 
(7) Separate concerns so that the scope of changes is limited. 
(8) Be as formal as possible by using precise and consistent notation. 
MIL-STD-483 calls for two documents. In part I the requirements for 
design, development, functional performance, test, and qualification are 
given. In part II the details of the configuration and the program itself are 
recorded as the final documentation for the item. 
From the application to the DAAS flight controls, the following 
conclusions were drawn. Both approaches place great emphasis on getting the 
hardware interfaces clearly announced. It was found that very minor items in 
the interface have profound implications for the structure of the system and 
the software. Both approaches require careful annunciation of inputs and 
outputs. The military standard requires this for each function; the NRL 
seems to tend toward this at the software systems level. 
Generally, the military standard was found to be inflexible and awkward, 
while the NRL style had the flexibility to fit the application. Many of the 
requirements set down in the military standard were answered by pat formulas 
which had very little real content. The section on testing is usually written 
this way, with promises that have no substance. until a definitive 
methodology for validation is worked out for flight controls, this will be the 
case. 
The NRL specifications do not consider the testing problem. Motivation 
and general descriptions were harder to include in the NRL outline. It was 
found that when changes came through, it was easy to change the finite-state 
machine descriptions, but it was hard to keep the general descriptions 
consistent throughout the documentation. 
The recommendation is to use the outline of MIL-STD-483, but to use the 
suggestions from NRL and others to make a more complete and meaningful 
document. The flight control functions should be described in a manner that 
best fits each particular function. Some alternate modes of description are 
reviewed below. 
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3.2.2 Functional Descriptions 
Any information or signal processing system may be thought to be made up 
of two flows--one is the information or data being processed by the system, 
the other is the sequence of control actions that manipulates the data (ref. 
17) • 
Petri nets (ref. 18) and LOGOS (ref. 19 and 20) are two graphical 
techniques for describing flows. A Petri net is a directed, bipartite graph 
of alternating vertices called places and transitions. It provides an 
abstract model of information and control flows. The major applications of 
Petri nets have been for systems of events in which some of the events occur 
concurrently, but with constraints on the concurrence, predecence, or 
frequency of the events. Petri nets are sketched as circles and bars, called 
places and transitions. The places represent states; the transitions are 
labeled with the events that enable the transition. The graphical technique 
LOGOS portrays these two flows in parallel graphs. The control graph 
initiates, sequences, and synchronizes the data operations on the data graph. 
LOGOS has been used to analyze very complicated systems, including the Air 
Force DAIS architecture (ref. 21). 
In many systems the structure for producing one of the flows is more 
complicated or fundamental to the system than the other. For example, in 
handling huge quantities of data, the organization of the data is central in 
designing efficient algorithms. One might say in this case that the data flow 
dominates the design considerations. For flight controls, the calculations on 
the data are not complicated, but the structure for controlling the 
computations is. Control flow dominates. The design will then be concerned 
chiefly with the control structure; the data flow will follow along naturally. 
Both LOGOS and Petri nets were found to be awkward, very complicated, and 
difficult to change or analyze without a great amount of effort. Finite-state 
machines or other direct descriptions appear to be appropriate for flight 
controls. 
A finite-state machine is the simplest computing structure. At the next 
level are the push-down automata, which have stack memories. The most general 
theoretical computing structure is the Turing machine. Finite-state machines 
use two expressions, called states and events. The states correspond to the 
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sequential circuits of the electronics engineer. Events represent an input to 
the control structure, signalling some important point of activity in its 
environment. 
The advantage of the finite-state machine representation is that it is 
precise and may be easily reviewed by control engineers for completeness. It 
may be used to describe system-level functions; it is not limited only to 
hardware or software. The states must be clearly identified and the events 
causing transitions must be defined. This provides a structure that may be 
completely tested. Fortunately, all flight control functions are either 
straight-line calculations requiring no past data, or calculations requiring 
only a fixed, finite set of past data. Hence, the latter functions may be 
represented as finite-state machines. 
A general finite-state machine is diagrammed in figure 16. When inputs 
are received, outputs are calculated as functions of the current values of the 
state variables and the inputs. Then the machine switches to a new state, 
again as a function of the current state and the input quantities. It is 
often useful to produce outputs associated with these state transitions; for 
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exarrple, a warning to the pilot upon automatic change of mode with loss of an 
input signal. These representations were found to be very natural for mode 
switching, signal selection, synchronization, and failure management. 
Finite-state machines are represented in two different ways--as a directed 
graph or a table. The directed graph approach is more intuitive because it is 
a picture. As the number of states, events, and state transitions grows, this 
advantage is effectively negated by the complexity of the diagrams. states 
are represented in the diagram as circles; legal state transitions are 
displayed as directed arrows connecting one state with another. The event 
that triggers a particular state transition is labeled on the arrow. The 
diagrams are interpreted in this way. At any time, the finite-state machine 
is in a current state. When an event is detected and received, the machine 
will make the state change indicated by the outgoing arrow labeled with that 
event. For a deterministic machine there can be at most one such arrow. When 
no such labeled arrow exists for the current state, this represents an error, 
and the machine will attempt to recover. The most simple recovery action is 
to ignore the event. The action sequence performed by the machine while 
changing state is generally not included in the diagram. 
The alternative representation is to describe the state transitions with a 
table or matrix. The entries in the matrix contain the number of the new 
state and an ordered list of actions to be performed to effect a change in 
state (possibly null). Blank entries are illegal state transitions and could 
contain some code to assist recovery. 
As the number of states and events grows larger, there is a need to 
partition the state machine so that each part is more manageable. To increase 
the clarity of the control structure, this partition should be done based on 
logical properties, and not in an arbitrary manner. The remote terminal 
function in section 3.3 illustrates how complex state machines can be 
partitioned into simpler ones. 
It has been shown on the DAAS flight controls that describing mode logic 
as a finite-state machine is very effective. It makes all design decisions 
visible for review and helps prevent errors of omission. Signal selection 
algorithms may also be precisely described as finite-state machines. An 
example is given in appendix A. These representations were also used to 
45 
analyze synchronization schemes. This application is also recorded in the 
appendix. Part of a triply-redundant failure management segment for data 
exchange and voting is analyzed in the appendix by tracing the syndromes 
caused by component failures. However, while many of the functions in flight 
controls are finite-state machines, we can be flexible and use whatever is 
most appropriate. 
The functions for flight control fall into categories for which general 
verification requirements will be prescribed: 
(1) The executive structure (initialize, branch in the rate tree, reCOver 
from power interrupts, equalize integrations, maintain the dynamic filter 
states, annunciate system status) 
(2) Data transfers (input, output, exchange data between channels) 
(3) Control mode switching and dynamical switching within control modes 
(4) Control law calculations (outer loops, inner loops, gain schedules) 
(5) Synchronization (synchronize channels, time-synchronize programs for 
transfers, etc) 
(6) Built-in-test functions (preflight checks, on-line checks) 
(7) Selection from redundant input signals 
(8) Failure detection and reconfiguration 
It is also necessary to show a global consistency between these functions, 
particularly the built-in-tests and the failure management functions. For 
functions that have auxiliary hardware, as does the frame synchronization of 
channels, it must be shown that the response of the software to a hardware 
fault cannot result in a single-point failure. 
3.3 FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION FOR THE REMOTE TERMINAL 
The remote actuator terminal will be used as an example of writing 
functional specifications abstractly, independent of the implementation. The 
purpose of this approach is to have specifications against which the system 
can be validated, regardless of the details of the hardware/software 
allocations. This will also provide a measure for checking these allocations 
and for reviewing the hardware/software interface. 
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Implementation details of the remote terminal were discussed in section , 
2.3.3. (See the block diagram in figure 13.) This paragraph provides a brief 
summary of the implementation for convenient reference. The servo commands 
are serially transmitted to the remote terminal from six or fewer computing 
channels. These will carry parity bits with which the fidelity of the 
transmission and the status of the sending channel may be determined. 
Three hydraulic cylinders are connected to sum forces to drive the 
aerodynamic surface and to provide triple redundancy. Any cylinder alone can 
position the surface. Each cylinder has a solenoid-held engage/bypass valve 
to control the status of the cylinder. The position of the cylinder, the 
position of the spool of the EHSV, and the pressure differential across the 
cylinder are measured by LVDTs. Each of these provides a signal attesting to 
the validity of the LVDT output. 
3.3.1 Top-Level Function of the Remote Terminal 
The remote terminal must select a suitable signal from six or fewer of the 
computer channels and drive the surface according to this command. The unit 
must be operational following any two component failures. The failure may be 
in mechanical, hydraulic, or electrical components. "Suitable signal" is not 
defined, but left as a choice in the design. 
3.3.2 Hierarchy of Functions 
The top-level function may be further specified in terms of the 
lower-level functions that are necessary. Figure 17 illustrates this 
decomposition. Design decisions are made in constructing this decomposition. 
Drive EHSV according to command. - One of the second-level functions of 
the remote terminal is to drive the EHSV of each redundant channel. This is 
accomplished by obtaining the input servo command and computing the control 
valve for the EHSV. The serial digital transmissions from the six computing 
channels must be received and interpreted. The presence of a signal and the 
validity of the transmission must be determined by the subfunction "validate 
signal transmissions." The "select command" subfunction must choose from the 
valid signals or perform median, averaging, or some selection process. The 
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OBTAIN INPUT 
SERVO COMMAND 
DRIVE EHSV 
ACCORDING TO COMMAND 
COMPUTE EHSV 
COMMAND 
VALIDATE SIGNAL 
TRANSMISSION 
SELECT 
COMMAND 
POSITION SURFACE 
ACCORDING TO COMMAND 
REDUNDANCY MANAGEMENT 
OF SERVO CHANNELS 
MONITOR 
CHANNEL 
MONITOR SERVO 
INPUT COMMAND 
ASSIGN 
ENGAGE/BYPASS 
MONITOR EHSV 
POSITION 
INTERPRET LVDT 
VALIDITY SIGNALS 
Figure 17. - Hierarchy chart of specifications for the remote terminal. 
RELIEVE 
FORCE FIGHT 
surface position, the valve spool position, and the differential of pressure 
in the cylinder are fed back and combined with the selected command as 
specified by the servo system control law. This control law computation may 
be analog or digital. An analog signal to drive the EHSV must be provided. 
Redundancy management of servo channels. - The other second-level function 
of the remote terminal is to perform the redundancy management of the servo 
channels. Redundancy management includes (1) monitoring the health of each 
channel, (2) either engaging or bypassing a channel based on its health, and 
(3) relieving the force fight among the engaged channels. The monitor channel 
subfunction is to provide the failure detection mechanism for the general 
operation of the servo channel. It may require self-checking circuitry. 
Proper monitoring of any D/A or A/D translations is required. A comparison 
between expected valve-spool position as predicted by a model and the measured 
valve-spool position is suggested. A subfunction to interpret LVDT validity 
signals is required to determine that the feedback sensors are all functioning 
properly. Each channel must be engaged or bypassed on the basis of the output 
of the monitor channel subfunction. Also, a mechanism must be included to 
relieve the force fight among the force-summed cylinders. The use of an 
active/on-line assignment with pressure differential feedback is suggested. 
3.3.3 Finite-state Machine Description 
The redundancy management of the three servo channels can be specified as 
a finite-state machine. The health monitoring function of each channel is 
used to assign an engage or bypass status. An engaged channel may be active 
or on-line, as described in the previous paragraph and in section 2.3.3. Thus 
each servo channel can be in one of three possible states: 
(1) Engaged and active 
(2) Engaged and on-line 
(3) Bypassed 
3 There are 3 = 27 states; the various transitions can be described 
based on changes in engage/bypass or active/on-line status. In order to study 
the engage/bypass function it is useful to cluster the 27 states into the 
eight groups shown in figure 18. Here transitions occur only if the engage 
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Figure 18. - Finite-state model for the remote terminal. 
status of any channel changes. States within each cluster cover all the 
active/on-line assignments, including those resulting from logic failures 
(i.e., all active or all on-line). To verify this function in the remote 
terminal, it must be shown that all transitions between clusters operate as 
specified. For example, the event "channel A bypassed" must take any of the 
eight states in cluster 1 to one of the states in cluster 2. To examine the 
active/on-line logic, the states within each cluster must be delineated. The 
transitions between states within a cluster can be verified, and it must be 
shown that the active/on-line logic does not cause transitions between 
clusters. 
The finite-state description of figure 18 was used as an example. It was 
also used to design the logic in the remote terminal presented in section 
2.2.3. This description is useful because it requires the designer to 
consider all the possibilities. In addition, by clustering the states, the 
operation of the engage/bypass logic can be separated from the active/on-line 
function. 
SECTION 4--SYSTEM RELIABILITY 
A major aspect of the design methodology is the estimation and validation 
of the system reliability. Crude estimates of reliability are obtained during 
the process of defining the flight control architecture. Once a candidate 
architecture has been defined, a detailed analysis to estimate the probability 
of loss of control per hour of flight must be performed. This theoretical 
estimate of probability must be substantiated with laboratory tests. This 
section discusses both the calculation of theoretical reliability and 
laboratory methods to verify and validate the reliability of the system. 
4.1 RELIABILITY ESTIMATION 
Sound theoretical estimates of the performance of the ultra-reliable FBW 
system are necessary. In formulating the theoretical models for the 
reliability analysis, the following assumptions are made: 
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(1) All possible failure modes of the system are identified and their 
effects on the system's operation are known. 
(2) The ability of the system to detect faults and to reconfigure 
automatically is implemented correctly by the software and the hardware of the 
system. 
(3) All component failures are random in nature, and their failure 
rates are known. 
(4) All possible interactions between the system and its environment 
have been foreseen. 
These assumptions separate abstract concept from physical reality. It is 
difficult to identify all possible failure modes of a complex system and to 
foresee all possible interactions of the system with its environment. Only 
through years of experience with flight control systems has confidence been 
gained that the abstraction comes close to physical reality. It is only with 
these assumptions, however, that theoretical methods can be applied and the 
-9 
system's design can be based on numerical values such as 10 per hour 
probability of failure. 
Before the detailed reliability analysis is performed, all pertinent 
component failure modes of the system are identified. Failure rates expressed 
as the MTBF of these components are estimated based on analysis, 
specifications, and experience with the actual unit, if it exists. The 
component reliabilities are combined in the statistical equations, from which 
the failure probability of the total system configuration can be computed. 
The equations take into consideration the number of redundant channels, the 
effects and interactions of a component failure on the other parts of the 
system, self-test coverage, and the reliability of each component. 
4.1.1 Fault-Tree Analysis 
Fault-tree analysis is the recommended method of computing statistical 
reliability. It provides a clear demonstration of the effects of system 
element faults, and computer tools aid its application. The fault-tree 
program used in this study can determine the sensitivity of system failure to 
the reliability of individual components. This serves to identify the 
critical components. 
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The fault tree graphically represents the logical relationship of a 
particular, undesirable event, called the top event, to the basic failures 
(causes) called pri~ary events. If system failure is the undesirable event, 
then the fault tree would graphically represent all the possible faults or 
failures, or their combinations, that could cause the top event to occur. 
After the failure model of the system has been expressed in the 
fault-tree format, the computer program, method of obtaining cut set (MOCUS), 
is used to provide qualitative analysis. HOCUS identifies and displays all 
critical failure paths (minimal cut sets) of a system's logic structure. 
The output of MOCUS is then used as an input to the kinetic tree theory 
(KITT) computer program for quantitative analysis. KITT provides information 
on the probability of failure as a function of time for each component, for 
each minimal cut set, and for the entire system. 
Before the algorithm is presented, some terms are defined as follows: 
(1) Cut set. - This is a collection of basic events whose presence 
will cause the top event to occur. 
(2) Minimal cut set. - A cut set is said to be minimal if it cannot be 
further minimized and still ensures the occurrence of the top 
event. 
(3) Boolean indexed cut sets (BICS). - BICS are defined such that, if 
all the primary events are different, the BICS are precisely the minimal cut 
sets. This definition of Brcs does not mean that the method is limited to 
fault trees with primary events appearing only once in the fault tree. The 
algorithm used in MOCUS starts with the top event and resolves the fault tree 
to obtain cut sets. An AND gate always increases the size of the cut set 
whereas an OR gate increases the number of cut sets. Cut sets obtained in 
this fashion are BICS. Duplicate events appearing in anyone BICS, if any, 
are eliminated. All BICS that are supersets of any other BICS are discarded. 
This process is illustrated in an example below. 
(4) Superset. - Superset is a BICS that contains every primary event 
that some other BICS contains, plus additional primary events. After this 
winnowing, the minimal cut sets are determined. 
MOCUS. - The algorithm used in MOCUS to find the minimal cut set is 
unique in that it starts at the main event (failure) of interest, called the 
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top event, and proceeds to basic primary events (component failure) to resolve 
the fault tree into cut sets. MOCUS guarantees that all the minimal cut sets 
are found. A main feature of MOCUS is the small execution time it takes to 
determine all minimal cut sets even for a large, complex tree. 
The MOCUS procedure uses boolean logic to determine the minimum group of 
cut sets that must be considered in determining the system reliability. This 
"minimization" greatly reduces the effort in calculating the reliability 
figures because it eliminates all duplication. An example of such 
minimization is illustrated below. 
The construction of the minimal cut sets will be illustrated with a 
simple example. Consider the logic diagram shown in figure 19. 
A. 
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The algorithm starts with the top event. The gate under the top event is 
ELEMENTS IN THE CUT SET 
I 
I A 
The inputs to the AND gate A are gates Band C. 
ELEMENTS IN THE CUT SET 
I 2 
I B C 
TOP 
EVENT 
Figure 19. - Sample fault tree. 
Gate A is replaced with its input, gates Band C. Gate B is an OR gate 
and its inputs are gate D and component 1. The OR gate increases the number 
of cut sets. 
ELEMENTS IN THE CUT SET 
1 2 
1 D C 
~ 2 1 C 0 
~ 
~ w 
w ~ 
~ ~ 
~ ~ 
z u 
Gate D is an AND gate with input of components 2 and 3. The AND gate 
increases the size (number of elements) of the cut set. 
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e:.. 
0 
E-+ 
:::.:: ~ 
~ UJ 
~ E-+ 
::;,::;, 
ZU 
ELE~ENTS IN THE CUT SET 
123 
1 2 3 C 
2 1 C 
Gate C is an OR gate with input of components 2 and 4. Replacing gate C, 
we have: 
ELEMENTS IN THE CUT SET 
123 
1 2 3 2 
2 3 4 
1 2 
4 1 4 
Cut sets number 1, 2, 3, and 4 are BICS. In cut set number 1, the basic 
event of component 2 failure is duplicated, thus eliminated. 
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ELEMENTS IN THE CUT SET 
123 
1 2 3 
2 2 3 4 
3 1 2 
4 1 4 
Cut set number 2 is a superset of cut set number 1, therefore it is 
discarded. 
ELEMENTS IN THE CUT SET 
123 
1 2 3 
1 2 
1 4 
For the sample fault tree the minimal cut sets are (2,3), (1,2), and 
(1,4). This result is used as input to KITT. 
KITT. - KITT is a computer code written as an application of kinetic tree 
theory. KITT requires as input the unique minimal cut sets of the fault 
tree. Exact, time-dependent reliability information is determined for each 
component of the fault tree and for each minimal cut set. 
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The failure intensity (6) of each component is assumed to be constant 
with respect to time (i.e., exponential failure distributions only are 
considered). As in kinetic tree theory, the components are assumed 
independent. All the components are assumed to be in their operating state at 
t = O. KITT can handle components that are nonrepairable or that have a 
constant repair time. 
The system reliability information, or system reliability 
characteristics, obtained from the minimal cut sets is: 
System failed probability--the probability that the system is in 
its failed state at time t. 
System failure rate--the expected number of failures the system 
will suffer per unit time at time t. 
I~ (t')dt' o 0 
System failure intensity--the probability that the system 
will suffer a failure per unit time at time t, given it is in 
its functioning state at time t. 
The expected number of failures the system will 
suffer during the time interval from 0 to t. 
1 - EXP[- It" (t')dt'] o 0 The probability that the system 
will suffer one or more failures 
in the time interval from 0 to t. 
Reliability results are obtained by upper-bound approximations. The 
upper bounds can be obtained when minimal cut sets are used to determine 
system reliability information. The upper bounds are excellent approximations 
to the exact values. 
The system failure rate WO(t), failure intensity "O(t), and failed 
probability QO(t) are bounded and approximated as: 
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v 
QO(t) < 1 - ~c [li- Q (t)] 
i=l 
where 
NC 
< L: w. (t) 
i=l 1 
L: 
i=2 
Iv (t) '. 
1 
NC v 
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i=l 
NC = total number of minimal cut sets 
v 
w. (t) 
1 
v 
Q. (t) 
l. 
= ith minimal cut set failure rate 
= ith minimal cut set failed probability 
Using these upper bounds for AO(t) and WO(t), upper bounds for the 
integral system characteristics can also be approximated as: 
NC 
E 
i=l 
v 
W. (t') 
1 
dt' 
NC v 
E W.(t') 
i=l ]. dt' 
NC v 
IT (l-Q.(t'» 
i=l ]. 
The upper bounds become the exact values if the minimum cut sets have no 
components in common--that is, the minimal cut sets are independent. This is 
quite important since the values are thus always conservative, resulting in a 
conservative estimate for system failure phenomena, 
4.1.2 Analysis of the Advanced Fly-by-Wire System 
The flight control system can basically be divided into the control system 
architect and the S-3A interfaces. The proposed microprocessor control system 
architecture was given in section 2. 
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The S-3A interfaces are hydraulic and electrical. The baseline S-3A 
hydraulic system is a dual system. The power source for the hydraulic system 
is the two-engine-driven pump with an electric-driven.pump as backup for 
system 1. The baseline S-3A electrical system consists of two engine-driv~n 
75 kva generators and an APU-driven 5 kva generator. Backup batteries are 
provided for the FBW flight control computers. It is assumed that three 
backup batteries are operative at dispatch. 
Three proposed refinements of the baseline configuration were studied. 
The goal was to improve overall system reliability. 
The first refinement is to incorporate a bigger auxiliary power unit 
(APU). This provides the capability of driving a 75 kva generator in lieu of 
the 5 kva generator. With this additional electrical power, a bigger backup 
electric-driven hydraulic pump can be incorporated. The additional electrical 
power also enhances the electrical power system. 
Another proposed refinement is to have three separate and independent 
hydraulic systems, with the additional third system powered by an 
electric-driven pump, without the benefit of the bigger APU. 
The last proposed refinement is to combine the above refinements, having a 
bigger APU and three independent hydraulic systems. 
The four configurations above were combined with the ADFBW architecture to 
construct fault trees for the following four cases: 
(l) FBW 3 
( 2) FBW 3 with bigger APU 
(3 ) FBW 3 with three hydraulic systems 
( 4) FBW 3 with bigger APU and three hydraulic systems 
Throughout this analysis, the fault trees constructed are of the 
primary-failure and command-failure types. Secondary failure fault trees are 
not included in this phase of the study. 
A component failure is considered a primary failure if it occurs while the 
part is functioning within the operating parameters for which it was 
designed. Command failures are failures of coordinating events between 
various levels of the fault tree, from basic failure events to the top event. 
Secondary failures are due to excessive environmental or operational stress 
placed on the system components. 
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Failure rates used in analyzing the S-3A equipments are point estimates of 
the in-service experience covering the 1980 and 1981 period. Estimates of the 
component failure rate were made for the new equipment. 
A total of 62 components was evaluated in the fault tree analysis. The 
components are included in the basic FBW system architecture and the 
electrical and hydraulic systems of the S-3A. Only the dispatch model of the 
FBW architecture was used. The dispatch model is the FBW system configuration 
with a minimum number of operative elements allowed for dispatch. The 
components used in the analysis and their corresponding failure rates are 
summarized in table 6. 
The loss of flight control probability for an hour of flight was evaluated 
for each of the four configurations as follows: 
(1) FBW 3 
PF = 6.188 x 10-
8 
(2) FEW 3 with bigger APU 
PF = 1.111 x 10-
10 
(3) FBW 3 with three hydraulic systems 
-8 PF = 6.227 x 10 
(4) FBW 3 with bigger APU and three hydraulic systems 
P = 1.843 x 10-10 F 
A computer printout provided documentation for each of the configurations 
and failure rates used. It also displays all minimal cut sets and their 
associated failure probability, in descending order. If further reliability 
improvement is deemed necessary, attention should be focused on the components 
in the top-ranked minimal cut sets. 
Configuration (2) above exhibits the highest reliability among the four. 
This configuration, in effect, has three hydraulic pumps with crossfeed 
capability between pumps 2 and 3. The disadvantage of this arrangement is 
that both systems are lost with the occurrence of a single failure, which 
depletes the hydraulic fluid. 
The anticipated increase of reliability with three independent hydraulic 
systems--configuration (3)--was not observed. This was mainly due to the fact 
that the third hydraulic system was constructed from the backup pump of system 
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. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
, 15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
computer 
Symbol 
AAPU 
ACl 
AC2 
AC3 
AC4 
APU 
AXl 
AX2 
AX3 
AX4 
AYl 
AY2 
AY3 
AY4 
AZl 
AZ2 
AZ3 
Az4 
BPMP 
BTl 
BT2 
CC1 
CC2 
CC3 
CTl 
CT2 
CT3 
ENGl 
ENG2 
GTEN 
IDGl 
TABLE 6. - ADFBW FAULT TREE PRIMITIVES 
Failure 
Rate 
(10-6/hour) 
438 
91 
91 
91 
91 
480 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
30 
38.7 
348.9 
348.9 
250.0 
250.0 
250.0 
40.0 
40.0 
40.0 
247.0 
247.0 
114.0 
5000.0 
Description 
Accumulator for APU starter 
Air data computer, channell 
Air data computer, channel 2 
Air data computer, channel 3 
Air data computer, channel 4 
Auxiliary power unit 
Longitudinal accelerometer, channel 1 
Longitudinal accelerometer, channel 2 
Longitudinal accelerometer, channel 3 
Longitudinal accelerometer, channel 4 
Lateral accelerometer, channel 1 
Lateral accelerometer, channel 2 
Lateral accelerometer, channel 3 
Lateral accelerometer, channel 4 
Vertical accelerometer, channel 1 
Vertical accelerometer, channel 2 
Vertical accelerometer, channel 3 
Vertical accelerometer, channel 4 
Backup pump for hydraulic system no. 1 
Battery no. 1 
Battery no. 2 
FBW computer, channel 1 
FBW computer, channel 2 
FBW computer, channel 3 
Copilot stick transducer, channel 1 
Copilot stick transducer, channel 2 
Copilot stick transducer, channel 3 
Engine no. 1 
Egine no. 2 
APU electrical generator 
Integrated drive generator no. 1 
~o. 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
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Computer 
Symbol 
IDG2 
PGl 
PG2 
PG3 
PG4 
PMPl 
PHP2 
PSl 
PS2 
PS3 
PTl -
PT2 
PT3 
RGl 
RG2 
RG3 
RG4 
RSl 
RS2 
RS3 
SBl 
SB2 
SB3 
SB4 
YGl 
YG2 
YG3 
YG4 
YSl 
YS2 
YS3 
T.~LE 6. - Concluded 
Failure 
Rat~6 
(10 /hour) 
5000.0 
30.0 
30.0 
30.0 
30.0 
209.0 
209.0 
90.0 
90.0 
90.0 
40.0 
40.0 
40.0 
30.0 
30.0 
30.0 
30.0 
90.0 
90.0 
90.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
30.0 
30.0 
30.0 
30.0 
90.0 
90.0 
90.0 
Description 
Integrated drive generator no. 2 
Pitch rate gyro, channell 
Pitch rate gyro, channel 2 
Pitch rate gyro, channel 3 
Pitch rate gyro, channel 4 
Engine-driven hydraulic pump no. 1 
Engine-driven hydraulic pump no. 2 
Elevator secondary actuator, channell 
Elevator secondary actuator, channel 2 
Elevator secondary actuator, channel 3 
Pilot stick transducer, channell 
Pilot stick transducer, channel 2 
Pilot stick transducer, channel 3 
Roll rate gyro, channel 1 
Roll rate gyro, channel 2 
Roll rate gyro, channel 3 
Roll rate gyro, channel 4 
Aileron secondary actuator, channell 
Aileron secondary actuator, channel 2 
Aileron secondary actuator, channel 3 
Sensor bus, channell 
Sensor bus, channel 2 
Sensor bus, channel 3 
Sensor bus, channel 4 
Yaw rate gyro, channel 1 
Yaw rate gyro, channel 2 
Yaw rate gyro, channel 3 
Yaw rate gyro, channel 4 
Rudder secondary actuator, channell 
Rudder secondary actuator, channel 2 
Rudder secondary actuator, channel 3 
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1. This effectively reduces the reliability of system 1 since the backup was 
removed. 
Configuration (2) is recommended. Additional details are given in section 
7. 
4.2 RELIABILITY VALIDATION 
To validate the reliability requirement in the laboratory, it must be 
shown that the system does indeed behave as the mathematical model. This must 
hold for all normal functions and all classes of failures that were 
hypothesized. The abstract assumptions leading to the design and realization 
of the reliability requirement must be shown to be closely related to the 
physical reality, and must be implemented correctly by the system's hardware 
and software. 
The following sections discuss the validation of component reliability, 
validation of fault tolerance, failure modes effects tests, and accelerated 
life tests. Detailed discussion of the automated iron bird tests is deferred 
to section 6. 
4.2.1 Component Reliability Validation 
Major components are identified in the preliminary design and the 
reliability analysis stages. The reliability of the components in terms of 
MTBF are established. In order for the reliability requirement of the total 
system to be achievable, the MTBF for each component must satisfy this 
requirement. The MTBF of existing equipments can best be obtained from field 
service experience. If that information is not available, results of the 
manufacturer's reliability test program for the equipment can be used. 
Reliability in terms of MTBF for newly developed equipments must be 
validated in the laboratory. This can be roughly divided into two 
processes--equipment burn-in and reliability qualification testing. Burn-in 
is used to assure that equipment presented for qualification testing is free 
of workmanship defects and other infant mortality problems. It consists of 
testing, analyzing all failures, incorporating corrective action, and 
retesting. This sequence is repeated until assurance is made that the 
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required reliability can be demonstrated during the reliability qualification 
test. The purpose of the reliability qualification test is to estimate the 
true MTBF of the equipment. Since constant failure is assumed, the equipment 
subjected to reliability qualification testing must be free of design defects 
or infant mortality type failures. The MTBF of an equipment can be 
demonstrated in the laboratory using statistical test plans such as those 
described in MIL-STD-781C. Depending on statistical confidence levels and 
discrimination ratios (criteria for acceptance and rejection), test hours of 5 
to 10 times the predicted MTBF are normally required. 
Measured component MTBFs should be fed back to the reliability analysis to 
reevaluate the total system reliability. If the reevaluated system 
reliability falls substantially below its required value, efforts must be made 
to improve the component reliability or to reconfigure the system. 
4.2.2 Fault Tolerance Validation 
Ultra-reliability of flight-critical systems is achieved through redundant 
design. The system must be able to tolerate multiple faults while maintaining 
undegraded flight operation. Validating the fault-tolerance and 
reconfiguration features of the system is the most critical step toward 
validating the reliability requirement of the total system. 
To validate the fault-tolerance requirement, actual hardware faults must 
be inserted into the system. The capability of the software to detect and 
isolate the faults and to effect system reconfiguration must be demonstrated. 
Transient faults must also be included. The timing of the fault relative to 
the control cycle of the system must be evaluated. These processes can best 
be accomplished in the iron bird, where a high degree of fidelity to the 
flight environment is obtained through including actual system components, 
with software executing in a real-time, closed-loop environment. 
The fundamental problem of fault-tolerance validation for a 
flight-critical digital system is the vast number of possible test areas when 
all combinations of flight conditions and multiple hardware faults must be 
considered. 
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In digital systems, software errors can only be uncovered by executing the 
software for a set of well-designed test cases. The following steps provide a 
solution to the problem. 
(1) Automate testing in the iron bird. 
(2) Generate a large but manageable number of test cases, from both the 
theoretical and practical perspectives, so that validation of digital 
flight-critical systems can be carried out conclusively and efficiently. 
A more detailed discussion on the approach and concepts of these two areas 
is given in sections 6.1 and 6.2. 
4.2.3 Accelerated Life Test 
A typical reliability "bathtub" curve is shown in figure 20, which 
compares life and failure rate. The horizontal line is the failure rate 
predicted for mature systems following debug and early life failures. At the 
end of the service, life wear-out and durability failure modes appear and 
increase the failure rate. 
Compressing the time factor by increasing cycling rates for high stress 
levels is the traditional method of demonstrating fatigue life. Similarly, 
increasing temperature and temperature cycling are the methods used to 
accelerate electronic systems burn-in and reduce the time required to achieve 
mature equipment failure rates. 
Figure 21 shows the impact of accelerated testing combining cyclic testing 
and environmental testing. In the random portion of the curve the failure 
rate will be higher than normal, but this rate can be used for analytically 
combining failure rates in the redundant configurations of the final design. 
By combining the concepts of automated cycling and increasing 
environmental stressing, accelerated life tests can be applied to the 
integrated FBW system in the iron bird. Test cases would be designed that 
consist of combinations of variables such as aircraft flight condition, 
environmental disturbance level, maneuver profile, and system model 
engagement. Environmental stressors such as extreme temperature and 
temperature cycling are applied to various components of the system. 
Automation would be used to step through the test cases with system and 
component performance monitored. Any inconsistency of system performance, 
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software logic error, and unexpected component failure is logged for later 
evaluation, and the system proceeds to the next test case. The same testing 
procedure can be repeated after incorporating any fixes and design changes 
until all design and software errors are resolved. 
Using a high degree of automation and applying severe stressors for 
accelerated life testing would substantially reduce total test time and labor 
cost. It should be emphasized that this procedure identies weak points in the 
design of the system and eliminates infant mortality type failures rather than 
demonstrating overall reliability of the system. The combined efforts of 
analysis, component reliability tests, fault-tolerant validation, software 
verification, and pilot-in-loop failure modes and effects tests are necessary 
to validate the reliability of the ADFBW system. Accelerated life testing, 
however, is an important step to obtaining high confidence that the system is 
qualified for flight. 
SECTION 5--S0FTWARE DESIGN AND VALIDATION 
This section continues the description of the methodology outlined in 
section 3.1. The design and validation of the software is described in this 
section. 
This section begins with a review of flight control functions. The next 
section reviews tools and techniques. Selected tools and techniques 
appropriate for flight control software are recommended. 
5.1 FLIGHT CONTROL FUNCTIONS 
A multichannel system in which the channels are synchronized for 
cross-channel comparisons requires the following functions: 
Initialize computer 
Run preflight built-in-tests 
Recover from power transients 
Initially synchronize with other computers 
Exchange state data, initialize state 
69 
Monitor sensors, select signals 
Manage failures, reconfigure system 
Branch to rate path 
Calculate control gains 
Run mode and switching logic 
'rest intercom 
Calculate control laws 
Test synchronization 
Test power supplies 
Run output test 
Perform CPU self-tests: 
Processor self-test 
Parity checker test 
Memory sum check 
Memory addressing test 
Watchdog check 
Scratchpad sum 
Sum check of constants 
Test program counter 
Annunciate system status 
Select output signals 
Monitor actuator response 
Frame synchronize the computers 
This software is not very complicated compared to general software 
systems. Indeed, many complete flight control systems have been programmed by 
a few control engineers. Most of these functions require straight-line 
programs. There are only a few do-while loops that depend on external events 
for termination and none that depend on their own calculations for 
termination. These event-driven functions are for timing synchronization 
events and for the watchdog timers. 
The executive structure assumed in the list is a simple rate tree that 
calls the functions in a fixed order. An alternative is to call tasks in an 
interrupt-driving structure. The first is usually chosen by control 
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engineers; the second is chosen when software experts, familiar with 
operating systems, do the designing. Each has advantages and disadvantages. 
A rate structure requires that the functions must be allocated to the 
branches of the rate tree so that the timing is balanced. This makes changes 
difficult because the time for execution must always be checked. Other 
aspects of the rate tree are easily verified. Since it is deterministic, 
testing will lead to confidence in its correctness. with a nondeterministic 
interrupt structure, no amount of testing can cover all of the possibilities. 
The software overhead and complexity is much higher if interrupts or a 
nondeterministic scheduling is used. Because of our concern for validation we 
recommended a rate-tree structure. 
If the channels run asynchronously and are not voted, all of the 
synchronization functions and many of the failure management functions are 
unnecessary. These are the functions that have been the most difficult to 
verify, to show as globally consistent, and to analyze for their response to 
hardware failures. Verifying parallel processes is orders of magnitude more 
difficult than verifying sequential processes. 
Most of the functions are straight calculations requiring no past 
results. The self-tests are of this type. The mode logic and control 
calculations require a fixed, finite set of results from the previous 
invocation of the function. These may be described as finite-state machines; 
however, control laws are better described by block diagrams or equations. 
Provisions for equalizing control law integrations are required when the 
channels run independently. These impose some requirements for data exchange 
between the channels. In general, however, all of the functions may be 
precisely described and verified. Flight control functions are largely 
independent, so that verification and testing of the individual functions 
carries over after the functions are integrated into the system. We will 
choose modes of description and verification specific to each type of function 
in our methodology. Our recommendations for describing the various functions 
are summarized in table 7 for the ADFBW architecture. The entries labeled 
"sequential code" will be described in a program design language. 
The next section surveys tools and techniques. We then return to complete 
the discussion of our methodology by describing the software design, coding, 
and test phases. 
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TABLE 7. - FUNCTIONS FOR SELF-CHECKING ARCHITECTURE 
Function Description 
Initialize computer Sequential code 
Run preflight built-in-tests Sequential code 
Recover from power transients Hardware diagrams 
Exchange state data for equalization 
or synchronization Sequential code 
Monitor sensors, select signals Finite-state machines 
Branch to rate path Sequential code 
Calculate control gains Sequential code 
Run mode and switching logic Finite-state machines 
Calculate control laws Block diagram, equations 
Perform in-flight self-tests Sequential code 
Annunciate system status Sequential code 
Select output signals Hardware description 
for the remote terminals 
Monitor actuator responses Hardware description 
for the remote terminals 
5.2 TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES FOR VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
A tool is a computer program which performs some task that would otherwise 
have to be done manually. Tools may be classified as static or dynamic. 
Static tools examine some aspect of the specificatons, designs, or code 
without executing the code of the software being inspected. An example of a 
static tool is the set/use checker, which checks that a variable is given a 
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value before it is used, or if a variable has been defined and given a value, 
checks that it is subsequently used. A dynamic tool performs some function to 
aid in testing the program when the program is actually executed. A timing 
analyzer that monitors and records the execution time of functions and 
subroutines is a dynamic tool. Two columns of static tools and one of dynamic 
tools are listed in table 8. Descriptions of these may be found in reference 
10. The first column of static tools lists those which examine a specific 
property; the second column are those which examine general or more extensive 
properties. The set/use checker is listed as a specific tool. A symbolic 
Specific Static Tools 
Circular reference 
checker 
Code comparator 
Consistency checker 
Cross-reference checker 
Data base analyzer 
Flow charter 
Interface checker 
Program flow analyzer 
Set/use checker 
Standards checker 
Units consistency 
checker 
Unreachable code 
detector 
TABLE 8. - TOOLS 
General 
Static Tools 
Accuracy analyzer 
Assembly code verifier 
Assertion checker 
Documentation and 
construction systems 
Formal languages with 
syntaax analyzers 
o Requirements 
o Specifications 
o Program design 
o Program code 
Sneak-path analyzer 
Symbolic evaluator 
Theorem prover 
Verification condition 
generator 
Dynamic Tools 
Simulations 
o Computer 
o Hybrid 
o Testbed (iron bird) 
o Monte Carlo 
Test data generator 
Test driver 
Test execution monitor 
Test record generator 
Timing analyzer 
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evaluator, a tool which automaticallY reconstructs the boolean or algebraic 
equations relating the outputs to the inputs, is listed as a general tool. 
Many of the static tools examine global properties--those related to the 
program as a whole. For example, the set/use checker may search through much 
of the program before it can make a determination on a particular variable. 
Techniques are the standards and procedures used in developing and 
maintaining the software package. In table 9, we distinguish between those 
for development and those for analysis or review. The entries are also 
discussed in reference 10. The list of development techniques cannot be 
omitted on the grounds that it is not verified and validated. Practice has 
shown that substantial gains in software reliability can be obtained by 
attention to description, documentation, and systematic development. 
Some approaches to software development use an integrated set of tools 
including static and dynamic code analyzers, test and simulation facilities, 
and documentation aids. Other methodologies use a formal design language 
based on the constructive approach outlined by Dijkstra, and have elaborate 
facilities for recording design progress and documentation on a large 
computer. An integrated approach is also taken for verification systems. In 
addition to static analysis and testing, verification conditions and symbolic 
executions are used. These systems show great promise, but it is currently 
difficult to determine the extent of the error coverage and the completeness 
of the entire verification procedure. 
The best engineering practice is to work at the lowest level of technical 
sophistication that will solve the problem. Flight control systems need not 
be obscure; the software functions to be performed are elementary. A 
verification and validation methodology with tools and techniques selected 
from the foregoing lists need not be elaborate. It must, however, be precise 
and complete. The next section outlines a methodology specific to a flight 
control system. 
5.3 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT 
Our methodology follows traditional lines, but with an emphasis on the 
simplicity and clarity of structure. Everything must be made "public" so 
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TABLE 9. - TECHNIQUES 
Development 
Abstractions and hierarchies to reduce 
complexity 
Constructive design approaches 
Data flow graph, structure chart 
Descriptions 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Charts 
--HIPO 
--Flow charts 
Languages 
--Requirements 
--Specification 
--Program design 
--Program code 
Petri nets 
LOGOS 
Design guidelines, test guidelines, 
coding guidelines 
Design standards, coding standards 
Functional capabilities list 
Organization as finite automata 
o 
o 
Parnas modules 
SRI International formal modules 
Axiomatic specifications 
Analysis 
System concept review 
Software design review 
Critical design review 
Qualification audit 
Checkout testing 
Singularities and extremes 
testing 
Integration testing 
Validation testing 
Symbolic execution 
Inductive assertions 
Proofs of data structures 
State transition proofs 
Recursion functions 
Fault-tree analysis 
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that the details may be reviewed and checked. The completeness of the 
configuration and its response to all anticipated events are set out for 
everyone to see. We cannot use the "wizard" who specifies, designs, and tests 
segments of code with little explanation and documentation. Flight control 
design is often done by three to four very experienced control engineers who 
collaborate and cross-check as the work proceeds. Proven software modules and 
functions are reused for efficiency and accuracy. 
5.3.1 Software Design 
The design of the software is based on the program performance 
specification and the interface design specification prepared during the 
requirements phase (refer to section 3). The output of this phase is the 
program design specification (PDS) and the data base design. The PDS tells 
how the program works by describing functionality and interfaces. It contains 
memory and time allocations and programming guidelines. The data base design 
describes all shared data. The specifications can follow MIL-STD-483 but 
require precise specification of functions. 
The software specifications, if complete, may be quickly transformed into 
the design for the software code. We have found that a hierarchy-
input-plus-output (HIPO) format is satisfactory for flight control functions, 
and we recommend it. The data flow between modules is clearly identified, 
state variables are precisely defined, and the program, expressed in any 
convenient program design language, is easy to review, to subsequently code, 
and to verify that it meets the software specifications. 
We have used an informal Pascal-like pseudocode as a program design 
language. It appears sufficient to represent the flight control functions 
unambiguously. Formal program design languages have been recommended. These 
have syntax and other features that may be automatically checked. Eventually, 
Ada will be used in this capacity. However, the fundamental simplicity of 
flight control functions allows these aspects to be checked with confidence by 
walk-through reviews. 
During this phase a software functional design review is held. This 
formal review of the detailed software design, documented in HIPO charts, will 
be conducted prior to the start of coding. The object is to demonstrate by 
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walk-through presentations that the software design satisfies the software 
specifications. Analysis to show the completeness and consistency of the data 
flow between modules will be presented. The global consistency of the 
built-in-tests and the failure management functions will be verified by a 
lattice showing the dominances of the tests. The operations and failure modes 
analysis of any synchronization schemes will be reviewed at this time. 
5.3.2 Coding 
The coding is done directly from the HIPO design charts. The code is 
verified by inspection and by testing. Prior to integration, each module will 
be informally tested to verify that it performs according to the design and 
fulfills the software specifications. The testing approach will be chosen to 
be suitable for the function of the module. 
The following test procedures are suggested for the classes of functions 
of the flight control system: 
(1) The executive structure for flight control is not complicated. It is 
feasible to test every path and every branching action. 
(2) Control mode switching modules may be designed as finite-state 
machines. These tests should verify that the processing of input data to 
yield transitional events and outputs is correct for each state and that all 
state transitions occur as specified. 
(3) A control law calculation may be verified by showing that a 
reasonable segment of the required frequency response is achieved. Extreme 
values of inputs and even stressed values of inputs must be tested to show 
that limiters and overflow provisions are operating correctly. Gain schedule 
calculations may be thoroughly tested. 
5.3.3 Testing the Code 
Each module can be exhaustively tested. All transitions of the 
finite-state machines can be checked. The built-in-tests and many other 
functions are copied from previous systems and have already undergone complete 
testing. Most of the functions are independent of everything else in the 
system, so their correctness will hold after integration if the input/output 
data flow is correct and the state variables and constants are correctly 
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maintained. A peer review of the code should be made to look for unusual or 
complicated constructions. 
(1) Most of the built-in-test functions are elementary and may be 
thoroughly tested for normal operation and simulated failures. Complete 
testing of wrap-a rounds and other exogenous procedures must wait for system 
integration. 
(2) The algorithms for redundant signal selections may be represented as 
finite-state machines and as such may be tested to assure complete confidence 
in their correctness. 
(3) There are also only a finite set of possibilities for the states of 
the failure detection and reconfiguration control structure. These modules 
may be tested to assure complete confidence. 
Tests are run after software modules are integrated to show that the state 
data is correctly preserved and that the data flow between modules is 
correct. Simulated failures to verify the response of the built-in-tests, the 
failure management structure, and the status annunciation are used. 
Tests are conducted after system integration to complete the verification 
of the flight control functions. This is discussed in section 6. 
SECTION 6--SYSTEM PERFORMANCE AND FUNCTIONAL VERIFICATION TESTING 
6.1 OVERVIEW 
This section describes our methodology for validating the functions and 
reliability of a system. Section 4 addressed the analysis and prediction of 
reliability. It recommended using a fault-tree description of the various 
elements. Validation by testing can be divided into two areas, as shown in 
figure 22. In the area of components and subsystems, it is feasible to run 
life tests to statistically validate MTBF predictions. In the system test 
area, it is not possible to run life tests. Instead, integrated system (iron 
bird) tests are used to verify the fault tolerance achieved by redundancy. 
These results, when combined with the component MTBFs, permit extrapolation of 
the complete system's reliability. 
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Section 6.2 discusses the design of test cases for integrated system 
testing. The finite-state machines used to specify the functions are now used 
in the validation testing phase. By virtue of using a finite-state machine, 
various "automata theoretic" results are available for specifying valid and 
reliable tests. Next the fault tree model is used to identify the various 
combinations of faults that need to be tested to demonstrate the predicted 
fault tolerance. Section 6.3 addresses the issue of automating the testing on 
the iron bird. This section concludes with a discussion of flight test plans. 
6.2 DESIGN OF TEST CASES 
Ultra-reliability of flight-critical systems is achieved through redundant 
design. The system must be able to tolerate multiple faults while maintaining 
undegraded flight operation. Validation of the fault-tolerance and 
reconfiguration features is the most critical step to the validating the 
reliability of the total system. These processes can best be accomplished in 
an iron bird, in which a high degree of fidelity to the flight environment is 
obtained by including actual flight hardware operating in a real-time, 
closed-loop simulation. The fundamental problem of fault tolerance validation 
is the vast number of test cases when all possible combinations of flight 
conditions and multiple hardware faults are considered. Effective testing 
requires: 
(1) A methodology using both theoretical and practical perspectives to 
define a manageable set of test cases. 
(2) Automating the testing as much as practical. 
Consider the set of conceptual states shown in figure 23. It can be used 
to visualize possible test cases. The universe of test possibilities is first 
divided into two areas: everything operable and some element failed. The 
operative region can be described by one or more finite-state machines. The 
effect of various failures on the system can be described with a fault tree. 
The "failed element" region includes failures for which a reconfiguration 
strategy was designed (i.e., switches out failed element), as well as failures 
external to the system which are to be tolerated (i.e., loss of a hydraulic 
power supply). The management of redundant elements can be described using 
finite-state machines. 
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Three cross-hatched areas represent regions where analysis can be used to 
reduce the number of test cases: 
(1) System failed. - These cases, identified as cut sets in the fault 
tree, are discussed in more detail below. 
(2) Inaccessible. - These states represent combinations of modes, flight 
conditions, or environments that are mutually exclusive and do not need to be 
tested. 
(3) Partitioned. - this area represents states that can be partitioned 
such that all combinations do not need to be tested. This could involve use 
of hierarchies of finite-state machines or partitioning on the basis of 
control modes, etc. The next section outlines a method for designing test 
cases based on the finite-state models. 
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6.2.1 Use of Finite-State Machines 
AS discussed in section 2, many of the "control structures" specifying 
mode switching, signal selection, and failure management can be described as 
finite-state machines. Using finite-state machines in system and software 
design provides a unique link between the specification, the design, and the 
testing phases. Automata theoretic results can be used to show the 
correctness of a control structure. The method consists of the following 
steps (ref. 22): 
(1) Estimate the maximum number of states in the correct design. 
(2) Generate test sequences based on the design. 
(3) Verify the responses to the test sequence generated in step 2. 
In step 1, the estimate can be based on the design. In step 2, test 
sequences are generated that exercise all the state machines (obviously 
these sequences are not unique). In step 3, the input sequences and their 
responses can be represented as "path programs." The correctness of these 
programs can be established by a walk-through procedure based on the 
specification. Since we have assumed the specification is not "executable," 
it is not possible to totally automate this step. 
The above method is both valid and reliable for checking the control 
structure. The detectable error classes include: 
(1) Missing states 
(2) Extra states 
(3) Transfer errors 
(4) operation errors 
It is particularly useful that theoretical results are available to 
extend the method to designs based on multiple finite-state machines and 
hierarchies of finite-state machines. For flight control a hierarchy of 
structured finite-state machines keeps the number of states of each machine 
at a tractable number. Some aids in deriving a hierarchy of structured 
finite-state machines from a given finite-state machine are given in 
reference 23. using hierarchies of finite-state machines is a tremendous 
asset in reducing the number of combinations. 
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6.2.2 Use of Fault-Tree Analysis 
The fundamental problem in the fault-tolerance test is the vast number 
of conceivable test states as multiple hardware faults are considered. To 
test all possible combinations of component failures for a large, complex 
system is clearly impractical. As a result, a more economical but 
theoretically sound and conclusive approach is needed to design the test 
states for multiple faults. We will describe such an approach based on the 
fault-tree analysis used to calculate the theoretical reliability. 
This paragraph summarizes the fault-tree method. A more elaborate 
discussion is found in section 4.1.1. Basically, the fault tree is a 
top-down method of describing the failure of a system. The top event is the 
occurrence of total system failure, modeled by logical combinations of the 
failure of its associated subsystems. This process is repeated for 
structuring the subsystems until reaching the lowest event--the failure of 
the basic components. Boolean expressions are generated that list all 
possible minimal combinations of component faults leading to total system 
failure. Each of these fault combinations is known as a minimal cut set. 
The probability of total system failure is computed by combining the 
probability of occurrence for each minimal cut set. 
The fault-tree analysis of a system can be used to develop test states 
for validating fault tolerance. The purpose of fault-tolerance testing is 
not to prove that the system fails when the fault tree predicts it will, but 
rather the converse. The purpose of this testing is to establish that the 
system works correctly when the fault tree predicts it will. To establish 
the former, the various fault combinations that make up minimal cut sets are 
used as test states, and the failure of the system is expected. This 
testing would demonstrate that the system fails at least as often as the 
fault tree predicts. The important case to establish is the latter. In 
this case, various combinations of faults that do not contain cut sets are 
used as test states. The system is expected to work correctly for all of 
these combinations. If it does, then this testing demonstrates that it 
works at least as often as the fault tree predicts. 
We define a test set as a set of component failures that contains no cut 
set. This means that the fault-tree analysis predicts the system should not 
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fail in the face of failures contained in any test set. A maximal test set 
is defined as a test set that is not contained in any other test set. This 
means if any componen~ failure is added to a maximal test set, the resulting 
set is a cut set. The relationships among these sets of component failures 
are shown in figure 24. 
One way of generating test sets is to consider the maximum components in 
each cut set that the system can tolerate. This is simply one component 
less than the total components in a cut set. The number of such test states 
is equal to the total number of components in the cut set. This approach, 
however, does not consider the combinations of the elements in one cut set 
with the elements of the other cut sets. The effects of these fault 
combinations are unknown if not tested. The maximal test sets do consider 
cross-combinations among several cut sets and so, in general, contain more 
elements than just "all but one component" from a cut set. 
These definitions allow us to state that a system works at least as 
often as its fault tree predicts if it works correctly for each combination 
of component failures in a test set. However, to test all the combinations 
in the test sets is still impractical for large, complex systms. We would 
like to use the maximal test sets for testing purposes in a way analogous to 
using minimal cut sets for reliability analysis. This requires the 
following assumption: 
If a system fails under a given set of component faults, then it will 
fail under the given set of component faults plus any additional component 
faults. 
This assumption is necessary to avoid having to test all combinations of 
faults in the test sets. With this assumption, it suffices to demonstrate 
the capability of the system to operate under the combination of faults in 
each maximal test set. 
These ideas will be made more concrete by means of an example. The 
example considers the 25 most likely minimal cut sets found in the 
reliability analysis of the ADFBW system, together with the S-3A systems 
(see table 10). Maximal test sets--the largest sets not containing a cut 
set--will be found for this example. Cut set numbers 1, 2, 6, 11, 12, and 
13 are independent minimal cut sets in that each of these sets has no 
elements in common with any other minimal cut set. Cut set number 11 is 
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Figure 24. - Any combination of component failures is either a cut set 
or a test set. 
typical. Three elements are contained in this cut set--the three redundant 
channels of the aileron secondary actuator (RSl, RS2, RS3). If all three 
servos fail, the roll channel fails, resulting in loss of aircraft control. 
The maximum number of aileron secondary actuator channel faults that the 
system can tolerate is therefore two. Since aileron secondary actuator 
channels do not appear in any other minimal cut sets, any maximal test set 
must contain exactly two aileron secondary actuator channel faults. 
Similarly, each maximal test set must contain exactly one element from cut 
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TABLE 10. - MINIMAL CUT SET DATA IN DESCENDING ORDER OF PROBABILITY 
Cut Set Maximum Failure Components Contained Description of 
Number Probability in Set ~Inemonic 
1 0.99989848E-08 ENGI ENG2 Engines 
2 0.156l9062E-10 CCI CC2 CC3 Computer channels 
3 0.99984777E-12 GEN IDGI IDG2 APU generator, integrated 
drive generators 
4 0.99984777E-12 AAPU IDGI IDG2 APU accumulator, integrated 
drive generators 
5 0.99984777E-12 APU IDGI IDG2 Auxiliary power unit, integrated 
drive generators 
6 0.99984777E-12 BPMP PMP2 PMPI Backup pump, pumps 
.., 
7 0.75346635E-12 ACI AC2 AC3 Air data computers 
8 O.75346635E-12 AC4 AC2 AC3 
9 0.75346635E-12 AC4 ACI AC2 
10 0.75346635E-12 AC4 ACI AC3 .. Ir 
11 0.72889996E-12 RSI RS2 RS3 Aileron secondary actuators 
12 0.72889996E-12 PSI PS2 PS3 Elevator secondary actuators 
13 0.72889996E-12 YSI YS2 YS3 Rudder secondary actuators 
14 0.8280l82lE-13 ACI AC2 SB3 Air data computers, sensor bus 
15 O.8280l82lE-13 AC4 AC2 SB3 
16 0.8280l82lE-13 AC4 ACI SB3 
17 0.8280l82lE-13 AC4 ACI SB2 
18 0.8280l82lE-13 SB4 ACI AC2 
19 0.8280l82lE-13 ACI SB2 AC3 
> 
20 0.8280l821E-13 AC4 SB2 AC3 
21 0.8280l82lE-13 AC4 SBI AC3 
22 0.8280l82lE-13 AC4 SBI AC2 
23 0.8280l82lE-13 SBI AC2 AC3 
24 0.8280l82lE-13 SB4 AC2 AC3 1~ 
25 0.8280l82lE-13 SB4 ACI ACY 
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set number 1 (since it has two elements) and two elements from cut set 
numbers 2, 6, 12, and 13. These cases are listed in table 11. 
The remaining minimal cut sets may be divided into two groups. One 
group is cut set numbers 4, 5, 6 and the other group is numbers 7-10, 
14-25. The two groups have no elements in cornman. For both groups, their 
contribution to maximal test sets is determined readily by inspection. The 
first group is illustrated in the Venn diagram of figure 25. Since each of 
these cut sets has the elements IDGI and IDG2 in cornmon, the maximal test 
sets fall into one of three cases: 
(1) All the elements except IDGI are included 
(2) All the elements except IDG2 are included 
(3) Only IDGI and IDG2 are included 
TABLE 11. - MAXIMAL TEST SETS FOR THE EXAMPLE ARE CONSTRUCTED AS THE UNION OF 
ONE SUBSET FROM EACH OF THE EIGHT INDEPENDENT GROUPS 
Cut Set 
Number 
1 
2 
6 
11 
12 
13 
4,5,6 
7-10,14-25 
Intersection of the Cut Sets with Maximal 
Test Sets (failed components) 
{ENG1}, {ENG2} 
{CC1,CC2}, {CC1,CC3}, {CC2,CC3} 
{BPMP,PMP1}, {BPMP,PMP2}, {PMP1,PMP2} 
{RS1,RS2}, {RS1,RS3} {RS2,RS3} 
{PS1,PS2}, {PS1,PS3}, {PS2,PS3} 
{YS1,YS2}, {YS1,YS3}, {YS2,YS3} 
{GEN,AAPU,APU,IDG1}, {GEN,AAPU,APU,IDG2}, {IDG1,IDG2} 
{AC1,AC2,SB1,SB2}, {AC1,AC3,SB1,SB3} 
{AC1,AC4,SB1,SB4}, {AC2,AC3,SB2,SB3} 
{AC2,AC4,SB2,SB4}, {AC3,AC4,SB3,SB4} 
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CUT SET 5 
CUT SET 3 
Figure 25. - There are only three groupings of the elements of 
cut sets 3, 4, 5 into maximal test sets. 
The second group, consisting of cut sets 7-10 and 14-25, has a symmetry 
which can be exploited. Cut sets 7-10 are all combinations of three faults 
out of four air data computers. Cut sets 14-25 are all combinations of one 
sensor bus failure and two faults out of the other three air data 
computers. (As an aside, two sensor bus failures and one air data computer 
fault is also a minimal cut set, but is less likely than the 25 shown in 
table 10.) The maximal test sets must contain failures of two air data 
computers and the two corresponding sensor buses. There are six such 
combinations. All the maximal test sets may be found in table 11. 
The total number of maximal test sets equals the product of the number 
of elements in each independent minimal cut set and the number of 
combinations from each dependent group of minimal cut sets. For the example 
problem, this is 
. 5 
2 x (3) x 3 x 6 = 8748 
In contrast, the total number of combinations of failures for the 30 
components in table 10 is 
230 = 109 
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Testing only the maximal test sets results in tremendous savings. Moreover, 
it is sufficient to guarantee the performance of the system under the 
assumptions stated above. 
It appears feasible to construct a computer program to generate all the 
maximal test sets from the minimal cut sets. Development of such a program, 
however, was beyond the scope of this program. Additional research and 
development efforts are needed to establish this feasibility. 
Considering only maximal test sets offers large savings in the number of 
required test states. Additional savings are realized if the system can be 
partitioned into groups on the basis of failure modes and effects analysis, 
or some other such analysis. The danger here lies in omitting some failure 
mode from the fault-tree analysis and then partitioning the system on the 
same basis. Still further reductions in the amount of testing may be 
obtained by calculating the probability of occurrence for each maximal test 
set. If this probability is sufficiently low, then the set can be 
eliminated as a test state. This elimination amounts to saying that the 
failure combination is so remote that the system is allowed to fail in 
response to that combination. This results in a slight decrease in the 
validated system reliability, in return for a reduction in the required 
testing. Together, these methods will produce a set of well-defined test 
states for validating the fault-tolerance of the ADFBW system. 
6.3 AUTOMATED IRON BIRD TESTING 
The vehicle system function mockup, commonly known as the iron bird, is 
a key element in the system verification, validation, and flight 
qualification. It exposes the real system to the most realistic environment 
by including actual hardware and interfacing subsystems (e.g., electrical, 
hydraulic, flight control systems) in the testings. This allows subsystem 
interface problems to be resolved and the performance of the integrated 
system and the pilot interface functions to be evaluated. Above all, it 
provides a high degree of confidence in the verification and validation test 
results. 
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6.3.1 S-3A Iron Bird 
The vehicle systems functional mockup, as the S-3A iron bird is formally 
known, was designed and used for the S-3A system development and evaluation 
test. The overview of the facility is shown in figure 26. Briefly, the 
S-3A iron bird is a full-size, spatially correct mockup of the S-3A 
aircraft. It uses a structural steel framework to support the aircraft 
functioning systems. within this steel framework are the various aircraft 
subsystems. Sufficient aircraft structure is incorporated to allow 
deflection of brackets, attach points, etc, thereby providing the same 
functional environment found on the airplane. The subsystems included in 
the iron bird are: the flight controls, hydraulic power generation, 
alighting and launching gear, wing and fin fold, and bomb bay door drive. 
Each of the subsystems is comprised of many individual elements, for the 
most part in their operational configuration. During the S-3A development, 
the iron bird was coupled to a moving base flight simulator so that the 
piloted experiments could be conducted in the most realistic fashion short 
of actual flight. 
Functional testing of system components using this iron bird is proposed 
to be an integral part of the total advanced flight control system 
development program. The S-3A iron bird provides an ideal testbed for 
directly comparing the existing flight control system with the system to be 
developed. Because the simulator is already designed and built, cost to the 
program will be minimized. All interface problems between the existing iron 
bird and the FBW components will be investigated and remedial action 
recommended. 
Our development program will parallel the previously conducted tests on 
the S-3A iron bird; however, there will be increased emphasis on automatic 
checkout in all system states. The tests can be grouped in the following 
categories: 
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Intersystem interaction effects 
. Subsystem performance and evaluations 
Complete integration 
Endurance cycling 
Simulated component failures 
Automated system checkout 
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Figure 26. - S-3A iron bird overview. 
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In the S-3A program all reasonable system failures (subsystem and 
individual components) were examined during the span of the program. Types 
of failures demonstrated were: 
Engine-out conditions during various flight modes 
Valve failures--various subsystems 
Broken linkages 
Mis-rigging mech~nical and electrical components 
Failed hydraulic lines 
Loss of fluid 
Electrical control logic malfunctions 
Jammed control linkages 
The preceding list of S-3A test programs indicates the scope of work 
possible on the iron bird simulator. Many of these tests were so critical 
that if performed on a flight vehicle they could have jeopardized the 
airplane and pilot/crew. However, when performed on a completely integrated 
ground simulator such as the iron bird, this costly risk was eliminated. 
6.3.2 Automated Testing 
Section 6.2 discussed the development of test cases. Fault insertion 
using the iron bird is an important part of validating the redundancy 
management and verifying the reliability prediction. Because large numbers 
of tests need to be run, benefits are derived by automating this process. 
Automation provides two benefits: 
(1) Time compression of test schedules 
(2) Repeatability of complex test procedures 
Automation can aid in performing complicated tests that require 
execution of precise operations in specific sequences, including the 
necessity for repeatedly performing tests under different test/failure 
conditions. Incorporating automation allows the performance of these tasks 
with a minimum of supervisory manpower needed to monitor rather than perform 
the- test. A sample test plan for iron bird testing is contained in appendix 
B. 
A robotic system concept for automatically controlling the iron bird is 
presented in this section. The design is highly modularized and can be 
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integrated into existing iron bird facilities with modest additions or 
modifications. The four fundamental function modules of the robotic system 
are the executive procedure, cockpit robotic computer, system monitor, and 
fault-insertion/environmental-input controller, as depicted in figure 27. 
Executive procedure. - The test state matrix consists of flight 
conditions, multiple hardware faults, environmental profiles, and control 
modes engagement, stored in the executive procedure module. The executive 
procedure module is the central controller of the robotic system for 
stepping through the test state matrix. Information is sent to each 
function module to set up the iron bird configuration for automatic checkout 
of all test states. 
Cockpit robotic computer. - The cockpit robotic computer emulates the 
pilot actions to control the airplane for those test states requiring manual 
interactions. Nominal command profiles such as airspeed, aircraft 
attitudes, trim settings, and procedures for modes control engagement for 
all maneuver profiles are stored in the robotic computer. These commands 
are converted into force commands, which are sent to specially built 
actuators and switches located in the cockpit, to generate command motions 
to the control stock, pedals, trim switches, and control mode switches for 
controlling the airplane in the simulator. Figure 28 shows a typical 
actuator interface for this concept. All information available to the crew 
such as fault annunciations, aircraft states, and command reference errors 
is fed back to the pilot model for corrective actions. pilot dynamic models 
such as those reported in reference 4 ate stored in the computer to simulate 
the pilot's response to various tracking tasks. This allows automated 
testings for the FBW system, in which the pilot's input is an important part 
of the system's design. 
System monitor. - The system monitor records all test results for 
post-testing data processing and for in-line monitoring of system status. 
Outputs from all subsystems, major components, aircraft simulator, fault 
annunciators, and simulated pilot's commands are collected by the system 
monitor. Total test times and component failures are logged for analyzing 
component reliabilities. Internal computer computations, such as the 
outputs and state transitions of the finite-state machines, are also 
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recorded by the system monitor for software verification. Data reduction 
after each test run can be done in a separate host computer for evaluating 
system performance and for comparing with predicted outputs. This process 
detects and isolates design and implementation errors. 
Fault insertion and environmental input controller. - This module 
provides interfaces with the fault injection hardware and the environmental 
control units. Multiple hardware faults can be inserted into the system by 
using relays for shorting of wires, solenoid switches for controlling 
hydraulic systems, switches for controlling electrical power systems, 
voltage regulators for inserting hardovers into sensors, and fault injector 
boards for injecting hardware faults into the FBW computers. Local 
insulated enclosures can be built around various subsystems for extreme 
temperature and temperature cyclings. Automatic setting of this hardware is 
provided by this function module. 
Implementation of the 'robotic system. - Current desktop 
microprocessor-based computers offer the following performance: 
(1) Active memory 2M bytes 
(2) Expandable mass storage 
(3) Clock frequency 
(4) Word length 
(5) I/O buses 
(6) I/O rate 
(7) Programming language 
Up to 125M bytes 
8 MHz 
16 bits output with 32 
bits internal architecture 
5 to 10 I/O cards which use 
popular I/O buses such as 
the IEEE 488, RS-232C 
1M bytes/sec 
HOL 
The high computation rate, large I/O interfacing capability, large 
available memories, and the relatively low cost of these processors are ideal 
for the applications of real-time automated testing of complex flight control 
systems. Also, the use of structured HOLS such as Pascal will reduce test 
software development cost. 
The low co~t of these microprocessors allows acquisition of several of 
these units for a modularized design of a robotic system, as illustrated in 
figure 29. The microprocessors are networked together with the executive 
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Figure 29. - Robotic system interface. 
procedure module as the central controller. Other modules perform a specific 
programmed task without exchanging information with other units for total 
system operation. 
This modularized approach offers the following advantages: 
(1) The system can be easily modified for integration with other iron 
bird facilities. 
(2) Modification and development OL a module does not affect total system 
operation, therefore reducing down times and other costly delays. 
(3) Other functions can be easily added to the system if determined 
necessary later in the program. 
6.4 FLIGHT TES'TING 
The S-3A is well-suited as a testbed to develop FBW concepts. There are 
four crew stations--two of these are pilot flight stations and the other two 
could be used for special purposes: that is, fault injection panel, 
configuration switching, or onboard data processing. Each station has a full 
escape system including ejection seat, oxygen supply, and suit 
pressurization. The modest fuel consumption allows the plane to fly more 
than six hours. However, each wing-mounted engine has enough reserve power 
to fly aircraft individually. The highly maneuverable airframe was designed 
to withstand 3.5g maneuvers and accomplish takeoffs and landings in short 
distances. When the antisubmarine warfare equipment is removed, the existing 
avionics racks have sufficient room to install FBW avionics and extensive 
instrumentation electronics. The basic S-3A was designed for continuous duty 
with minimum maintenance. 
Flight testing to develop FBW systems can be divided into two 
categories. The first is fault-free testing to verify the control laws, 
demonstrate handling qualities, and accomplish the usual envelope expansion. 
The second involves inserting faults in flight to validate fault tolerance. 
,Prior to flight testing, extensive ground checks will be made to ensure 
that the control system conforms to design specifications and iron bird 
tests. These checks will include end-to-end gains, system operational 
checks, frequency response tests, and ground shake vibration tests. 
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6.4.1 Performance Verification Flight Testing 
The purpose of performance verification flight testing is to verify 
control law design and demonstrate that the handling qualities of the FBW 
system satisfy requirements. The basic FBW modes to be tested include the 
augmentation modes and the alpha limiting mode. All autopilot modes must 
also be engaged to demonstrate that there is no adverse interaction between 
the autopilot and the basic flight control system. The nominal loop gain can 
be verified to show stability margins. Finally, the aircraft will be flown 
in turbulence to assess gust responses. 
6.4.2 Failure Mode Flight Testing 
The purpose of these tests is to validate the fault-tolerant design and 
verify the fail-operational capabilities of the FBW control systems. A few 
selected tests of this nature will be performed to back up the comprehensive 
testing that was conducted on the iron bird. 
There are two types of failure mode tests. The first simulates a system 
failure by turning off one or more channels of a major subsystem: that is, 
hydraulic iI, B electrical bus, no. 1 air data system, or no. 3 aileron 
actuator. The second type of failure test intercepts a signal going to the 
computer and inserts a bogus signal. This type of testing will be performed 
on the sensors, actuators, and the air data computer. 
6.4.3 FlightTest'Support 
Special instrumentation and software modules will be used to support 
flight test. The purpose of the flight test instrumentation is to: 
(1) Provide test data that validates FBW system performance 
(2) Document all actual or simulated failures that occur 
(3) Generate the engineering data necessary to enhance system design 
(4) Provide real-time ground monitoring through telemetry 
The onboard instrumentation system will monitor all record and telemeter 
commands, input signals, and the state of the computer at all times. 
Information generated will be available to onboard personnel and will also be 
transmitted to the telemetry station. 
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Software modules need to be added to the FBW computers for flight 
testing. Typical modules include the stability module, fault insertion 
module, and instrumentation module. The stability module will give onboard 
personnel the capability of changing system gain or time constants with 
external switches placed in the flight station. The fault insertion module 
will be used to verify the fault-tolerance capability of the software. The 
instrumentation module will transmit the state of the system and other 
pertinent data to the instrumentation system. 
SECTION 7--S-3A INTERFACES 
7.1 FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM INTEGRATION 
The primary goal during this phase of the integration study effort was to 
determine a method of integrating the system into the S-3A aircraft with 
minimum cost. This would be accomplished by minimizing components developed 
specifically for the S-3A which would not particularly demonstrate features 
of the ADFBW system. The integration also should provide a flexible test 
vehicle with expansion capability and, above all, should assure flight safety. 
The result of this effort suggested a method of integrating the ADFBW 
system with very little risk, development activity, design activity, or 
fabrication effort. The method is to use the existing surface actuators, 
eliminating all existing mechanical linkages and cables. 
The baseline S-3A flight control system was originally designed with the 
objective that the aircraft be controllable even in the event of total loss 
of hydraulic and electrical power. This objective influenced almost every 
aspect of the design, even to the extent, for example, of using low-friction 
seals on the main ram of each surface actuator to reduce the force necessary 
to move the surface in the unpowered mode. This design feature was provided 
at the cost of lower seal life expectancy and lower reliability. Figures 30 
through 32 show a schematic of the baseline S-3A primary flight control 
system in the pitch, yaw, and roll axes, respectively. 
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Modifying the baseline design to accommodate a different objective 
requires that consideration be given to flight safety as well as to the cost 
of making the modification. 
The modification we are proposing satisfies both flight safety and 
minimum cost. It consists of 
(1) Completely decoupling the cockpit controls from the flight control 
system 
(2) using the existing cockpit controls for inputs to the ADFBW system 
(3) Using only the control surface actuators from the existing flight 
control system 
A preliminary layout was made to investigate the feasibility of 
installing secondary actuators in the pitch, roll, and yaw axes. The layout 
shows the installation to be feasible with no major rework of the aircraft 
necessary. 
The addition of the secondary actuator introduces an additional time 
delay in the control system that does not exist in the basic S-3A flight 
control system. If the secondary actuator is designed to have high-frequency 
response, the time delay will be small and is not expected to significantly 
degrade aircraft handling qualities. 
The ability to use existing S-3A surface actuators at the beginning of 
the test program allows a most significant economy. Designing, testing, and 
demonstrating that a new actuator meets hinge moment, stiffness, frequency 
response, hysteresis, and flutter requirements is not required because the 
existing actuators already provide these capabilities. Furthermore, new 
actuators may present a maintenance problem (repairing leaking servos, etc), 
whereas replacement spares for the time-proven original actuator, if 
required, are probably available from Navy inventories. 
It appears that the same type of secondary actuator can be used for all 
three axes. 
A preliminary sizing of the secondary actuator was made for the purpose 
of determining installation space. The force requirement for the secondary 
actuator is predicted on 
(1) Operating the surface actuators in the manual mode--that is, unpowered 
(2) Retaining the feel cams from the surface actuator 
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The secondary actuators should provide a force input to the primary 
surface actuators equivalent to that provided by a typical pilot acting on 
the controls in the cockpit of the basic S-3A. The feel cams could be 
removed from the primary surface actuator, thereby reducing the force 
requirements of the secondary actuators. However, in order to remove the 
feel cams, the actuator would need to be disassembled at the factory and then 
retested after rework. The actuators would become unique and repair or 
replacement more difficult. 
The force and stroke required of the secondary actuators operating in a 
single-channel mode is 500 pounds and 3.0 inches. 
A Hydraulic Research secondary actuator, which is triple-channel tandem 
with only one active channel operating at a time, was selected for this 
·application. This actuator has a size of about 5.5 inches x 4.5 inches x 
16.5 inches. This actuator provides 900 pounds force output with a 1.O-inch 
stroke. A slightly larger piston diameter and a bell crank to change gearing 
to the correct stroke will allow this actuator to meet requirements. 
A preliminary layout was made of the installation of the selected 
secondary actuator driving the elevator power servo. Figure 33 shows the 
result of the layout with the secondary actuator positioned just forward of 
the primary servo. The tension regulator is removed to make the space 
available. The selected installation has reasonable access by way of the 
access hatch located in the left landing gear well, which leads into the 
environmental control system compartment. 
A similar preliminary layout was made of the yaw axis secondary actuator 
installation. As shown in figure 34, adequate space exists above the fin 
fold line to install the actuator near the rudder primary actuator. The 
actuator is shown mounted on the forward spar. Access to the installation 
will be available from the rudder servo access plate on the right side of the 
fin above the stabilizer. 
The aileron secondary actuator installation presents a more difficult 
installation. The result of the preliminary layout is shown in figure 35. 
Access to the aileron secondary actuator installation will be the access 
door to the environmental control system compartment. 
104 
, 
'II , ' 
ELEVATOR POWER SERVO 
_fBL\_ : ~ L; --~~-+---------4--+ 
\~--=-===l===== =m-
SECONDARY ACTUATOR 
Figure 33. - Elevator secondary actuator installation. 
SPAR ASSY 
I 
I 
+-
RUDDER POWER SERVO 
SECONDARY ACTUATOR 
-FIN FOLD RIB 
----
~----
Figure 34. - Rudder secondary actuator installation. 
£AILERON POWER SERVO 
-.~-- ~ 
+1-------- --:~-~ .. -c;:.~ 
~--
SECONDARY ACTUATOR 
Figure 35. - Aileron secondary actuator installation. 
Separate new actuators are required to drive the ailerons in a symmetric 
manner. This can be achieved by using two additional series actuators, one 
for each aileron. Th~s configuration was selected because of the following 
considerations. The ailerons are controlled by a single aileron power servo, 
installed in the environmental control system compartment, which drives 
pushrods to each aileron. The aileron servo also provides a mechanical input 
to the spoiler actuator. Rather than redesign this total system, it is 
recommended that additional actuators be used. 
The actuators selected for the symmetric aileron mode will be 
electromechanical actuators. Development of the mode could be a follow-on 
expansion program after the flight test of the.ADFBW system has commenced. 
The logical location for the electromechanical actuators is in each wing 
because they must work in conjunction with the aileron pushrods, and space in 
the fuselage between the aileron actuator and the aileron pushrods going out 
of the fuselage is very limited. The space available in the S-3A wing is 
limited because of fuel tanks and hinges for folding. 
A brief effort was made to determine the feasibility of locating the 
actuator in the wing. Figure 36 shows the result of this effort. The 
actuator was sized for the available space at this location instead of for 
the task required. It"is likely the space is too small for an 
electromechanical actuator. The installation is made practical by removing 
the lower spoiler dwell actuator. In so doing, the lower spoilers are made 
inoperative and the panels are sealed closed. The baseline S-3A uses the 
lower spoilers only when the flaps are up. The loss of roll control power 
will not be significant. Some slight pitching movement may result at 
high-speed roll maneuvers due to not using the lower spoilers and only using 
the upper spoilers. This should not present a problem because with the ADFBW 
a simple crossfeed of roll into pitch can significantly reduce any pitching 
moment. 
The feasibility of alternate installation areas should be determined. 
Another possible actuator location is in the wing beyond the wing fold line. 
A third possibility is in the environmental control system compartment near 
the aileron primary and secondary actuators. Future study should be devoted 
to these areas. 
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Figure 36. - Active-control actuator installation. 
In summary, the locations of all the flight control actuators are shown 
i~ figure 37. 
7.2 COCKPIT CONTROLS INTEGRATION 
The task of providing cockpit controls for the ADFBW requires compromise 
to avoid much redesign effort. If a new control stick or side-stick 
controller is to be provided, many of the additional functions provided by 
the original control stick and pedals must also be provided. Some of these 
functions are nose gear steering and its engage/disengage function, pitch and 
roll trim, trim disconnect, autothrust disengage, autopilot disengage, 
communications switch, and brakes. 
A right-hand controller is required if other than a center stick is used 
because the throttles are located on the left side of both pilot and 
copilot. Mounting the controller would require a different installation for 
pilot side (center console) and copilot side (side console); thus, two 
designs are required. Both installations must avoid interference with the 
ejection seats. 
Consideration of the above design tasks persuades us to recommend using 
the existing installation, with modifications as required. The modifications 
will consist of removing their respective cable systems, the bobweight, and 
the stick damper. The column should be statically rebalanced by means of the 
balance spring, a spring gradient added to provide a stick force gradient and 
pedal force gradient, and six LVDTs installed per axis to measure control 
inputs. No installation difficulties are foreseen with this approach. A 
diagram of the reconfigured controls is presented in figure 37. 
7.3 SENSOR INTEGRATION 
Individual sensors do not present an installation problem. However, 
installing sextuple sensors requires suitable space so that each of the 
sensors is in the same environment as the others to ensure that cross-channel 
monitoring can have practical levels. In some cases, such as the 
pitot-static system, this may be impractical. 
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Figure 37 -• - Su rnrnary fl' , 19ht control h c anges. 
Installing mUltiple pitot-static probes on a small aircraft presents more 
of a problem than on a wide-body aircraft. Separating the systems as widely 
as possible so that bird strikes will not damage all systems is not 
consistent with providing the same airflow around each probe for 
multiple-channel tracking. 
The following configuration is recommended based on the history of probe 
development and probe installation on the S-3A. (See figure 38.) 
The present two-channel pitot-static system installed on the S-3A should 
be extended to a four-channel system. The baseline S-3A has a probe on each 
side of the fuselage, ahead of the cockpit. Each probe has two static ports 
and a single pitot input. Each static port is crossfed to the opposite port 
on the other probe. In this manner effects of sideslip are minimized. 
Probes identical to those presently installed on the S-3A should be 
specified so that correction for static defect curve (probe angle-of-attack 
effects) need not be reestablished. The correction will be particularly 
important for four-system tracking as required for cross-channel comparison. 
Part numbers and the approximate location for the new probes are shown in 
figure 39. The new probes will be mounted just under the existing probes but 
with enough separation to minimize shadowing for most angles of attack. 
Additional lines must be plumbed from the new probes to the right internal 
electronics bay. Six air data computers will be coupled to-the four 
pitot-static systems. 
Rate gyros and accelerometers can be mounted in the bomb bay area on the 
keelson approximately at the wing quarter-chord. Adequate space exists for 
the installation. 
7.4 AVIONICS INTEGRATION 
Ample space and facilities exist on the S-3A aircraft for installing the 
new avionics of the ADFBW system by removing the unnecessary avionics. It 
should present no installation or access difficulty • 
. The internal avionics racks will provide sufficient space with 
hard-mounting possibility. The racks will have a controlled temperature 
environment and adequate cooling will be supplied by the ducted avionics 
cooling system. 
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The two remote terminals can be installed in either a controlled or an 
uncontrolled environment area. The internal avionics area will provide 
environmental control. The environmental control system compartment, or the 
bomb bay area, will provide ample space for avionics in an uncontrolled 
environment. Both areas are accessible for ground checkout and maintenance. 
7.5 HYDRAULIC SYSTEM 
A review of the S-3A hydraulic system (including approved ECP 347 
changes) was made regarding its adequacy to support the ADFBW system. Flight 
safety of the flight test vehicle was the paramount aspect of the review. It 
was concluded that no significant changes to the S-3A hydraulic system are 
required. 
The baseline S-3A has two engine-driven, independent hydraulic systems to 
provide dual-channel flight control hydraUlics. System 1, the flight 
control/utility (FC/U) system, powers all utility functions (landing gear, 
brakes, nose gear steering, flaps, etc) in addition to the flight controls. 
System 2, the flight control (FC) system, powers only the second channel of 
the flight control system. As shown in figure 40, each system can by itself 
provide complete flight control capability. 
A third hydraulic pump will be added when ECP 347 is incorporated. This 
pump, driven electrically by either generator (but not by the baseline APU) 
will be plumbed into the FC/U system and will function as an emergency backup 
pump. It the left engine is shut down or the FC/U system pump fails, the 
emergency pump can be used to do all the work of the engine-driven pump. 
Throughout the history of the S-3A as known by Lockheed project 
engineering, total hydraulic power has never been lost. (At this time, 
approximately 1% of the aircraft have the third hydraulic pump 
incorporated.) Based on this history, the baseline dual system appears 
adequate and safe to support the ADFBW system. Adding the third hydraulic 
pump should reduce the chance of losing all hydraulic power even further. In 
addition, the third hydraulic system will provide hydraulic ground checkout 
capability without needing a hydraulic rig. Only an electrical ground cart 
is required. 
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Figure 40. - Hydraulic distribution system (dual-channel). 
The modification of the existing hydraulic system will consist of teeing 
into the pressure and return lines of both the FC/U and FC systems. The tee 
will provide hydraulics for the pitch, roll, and yaw secondary actuators. TwO 
channels of the secondary actuators will be powered by the FC/U system and one 
channel will be powered by the FC system. 
7.6 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM 
The S-3A electrical system has been reviewed with respect to the 
anticipated requirements imposed on it by the ADFBW system. It is concluded 
that the impact is minimal and no extensive or costly modification to the S-3A 
electrical system will be required. 
The baseline S-3A has two separate engine-driven generators, each of which 
can be bused to supply all electrical needs. An additional 5 kva generator is 
powered by the APU. This unit is only large enough to supply essential 
electrical power, such as the pitch trim actuator and flight instruments 
(refer to figure 41). 
An engineering change proposal (ECP) is being prepared to install a larger 
APU in the S-3A. This unit would be capable of supplying the ADFBW system. 
An S-3A with the ECP incorporatd (larger APU) should be used for the ADFBW 
demonstration aircraft. 
A 28V dc storage battery sufficient to supply electrical power to two of 
the six channels of the flight control system will be installed in the bomb 
bay compartment. ~~o typical IZV batteries should be adequate to power two 
channels of flight controls for at least two hours in case of an emergency. 
SECTION 8--CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
. This study has defined an architecture and a methodology for its 
development. The architecture claims advantages by virtue of 
(1) Less software 
(2) Self-checking hardware 
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(3) Emphasis on using standards 
Instruction set: l750A 
HOL: Ada 
Serial bus l553B 
(4) Hardware advances that yield maintenance benefits by including spare 
elements 
This architecture has emphasized simplicity. This yields tractable 
modeling problems to estimate reliability and easier verification of the 
software. In spite of the hardware-intensive nature of this architecture, we 
recognize that software requirements will grow as new functions are integrated 
with flight control. Two options for expanding the computer throughput are 
shown in figure 42. Figure 42a shows the addition of another CPU chip using 
the multiprocessor option provided on the Fairchild l750A. This feature 
allows both processors to access a common memory without contention problems. 
Figure 42b shows the addition of SCMPs to the redundant sensor bus. These 
additional processors can perform non-flight control functions (i.e., 
navigation/flight management). Spare SCMPs may be used as back-ups for both 
flight control and non-flight control functions. Investigation of functions 
other than flight control was beyond the scope of this study. However, this 
architecture is well-suited to expansion. 
The methodology claims advances in 
(1) Presenting aids to formulate complete specifications 
(2) using finite-state descriptions and fault tree models to define test 
cases 
The development methodology proposed is within the state-of-the-art, and 
is a cost-effective way to produce flight-critical software. Research in 
fault-tolerant computing is currently an active area. Work is ongoing in many 
areas, including reliability modeling, fault-tolerant software approaches, 
formal methods for design proving, and design of real-time operating systems. 
As previously noted, software requirements are increasing and may benefit from 
the. results of this research. We view the entire development methodology as 
continually evolving and expect to incorporate new techniques as our knowledge 
expands. 
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Finally, automation of iron bird testing is recommended to achieve time 
compression and enhance productivity. We believe this is a good time to 
initiate the ADFBW development. Figure 43 suggests follow-on activities. 
S.l RECOMMENDED FOLLOW-oN 
Three one-year efforts are shown in parallel to support the major 
development activities in phase 1. 
The system specification activities define the technologies used to 
implement the elements of the architecture and detail the interfaces. The 
system specification will be sufficiently detailed to permit hardware design 
to start in phase 1. A top-level system specification is prepared and the 
fault tree reliability modeling is expanded. 
The test design methodology addresses issues raised in section 6 
concerning the application of finite-state machines and fault trees. These 
techniques will be examined and results extended to evolve a practical 
methodology for designing test cases. 
The robotic demonstration is intended to take an initial look at the 
issues of automating iron bird testing. It develops the computer interface, 
robotic actuators, and system instrumentation. A demonstration on an 
existing facility (like the F-S) is recommended. 
Following these support activities a two-phase program is shown, leading 
to and including flight test. Phase 1 comprises those tasks required to 
complete iron bird testing of the ADFBW system. This phase lasts three years 
and includes: 
(1) Detailed hardware design 
(2) Software design and coding 
(3) Interface checkout, system simulation, and accelerated life testing 
(4) Iron bird testing 
Development of verification and validation tools occurs in parallel. 
This activity designs the test cases and develops the hardware and software 
necessary for automated iron bird testing. 
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Phase 2 is the flight test phase for the basic ADFBW sytem. It includes 
aircraft modification and one year of flight testing to verify the 
performance of the basic design. It could start in mid-1987. 
The S-3A ADFBW test vehicle could support a variety of flight research 
experiments. The five options shown in figure 42 are described below. 
Option 1 involves testing of electromechanical actuators. Tasks are 
proposed in a time frame that resumes flight testing in the shortest time 
following the basic phase 2 flight test interval. The ADFBW system will 
follow the verification and iron bird test methodology developed and used in 
phase 1. Flight test follows, conservatively at first, with the 
electromechanical actuators used only for powering the spoilers. The 
electromechanical actuators' successful service in a non-flight-critical 
application establishes their readiness for flight testing in all the surface 
actuator positions. 
Option 2 flight tests an advanced wing requiring extensive use of active 
control technology. This effort could start in 1989 or earlier, depending on 
other research and development activities in this area. 
Option 3 involves using advanced displays. These flight tests are 
scheduled for 1988-1989, at which time flat-panel devices should be 
available. A low-risk look at this technology can be made with an early 
flat-panel test in a rear crew position of the S-3A. In fact, years of 
"ridealong" testing could be acquired in a very nonobtrusive fashion in the 
rear position. When adequate reliability is achieved, one or both forward 
positions could be equipped with the advanced displays. 
Option 4 is a test of flight management system and air traffic control 
system integration possibilities, rather than an application of 
ultra-reliable electronic technology. Rated as a fairly low-priority option 
it could, however, provide the S-3A test vehicle with the necessary avionics 
to engage in sophisticated air traffic control experiments. An example would 
be multiple airplane tests of curved approaches to microwave landing system 
airports. 
Option 5 adds the capability to operate one engine with digital engine 
controls. The S-3A is an ideal testbed for this purpose since it has two 
engines and excellent performance, even with one engine out. In the proposed 
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study the flight propulsion control coupling possibilities and 
engine/airplane electric power sharing will be investigated. 
The preceding discussion illustrates that the ADFBW S-3A would result in 
a flexible testbed vehicle for NASA that could support a variety of research 
areas. This theme is expanded on below. 
8.2 EXPANSION TECHNOLOGIES 
The preceding sections have described an ADFBW system. We have discussed 
the issues involved in installing such a system on the proposed testbed 
aircraft on S-3A. We conclude this technical discussion with a brief look at 
several nexpansion technologiesn that could be the subject of research and 
development at NASA on the S-3A ADFBW aircraft. These expansion technologies 
are non-flight-control technologies that will figure prominently in the 
efficient all-electric aircraft of the future. Figure 44 is a roadmap of 
five expansion technology areas. The development of these technologies over 
the next 20 years is outlined below. 
8.2.1 Active Control and Advanced Wing Technology 
Active control technology is represented along the bottom portion of 
figure 44. New aft-loaded airfoils require CG placement that yields relaxed 
static stability to the point that FBW stability augmentation is needed. 
Next-generation wing designs will require FBW technology to achieve the 
optimum aerodynamic and structural efficiencies. 
Using the S-3A as a test vehicle could be valuable in this area. A new 
wing could be demonstrated. On the new wing, active controls would provide 
maneuver load control, in which symmetric aileron deflection would unload the 
tips at load factors greater than Ig, thus conserving wing structural 
weight. The pitch control system, acting in cooperation with the ailerons, 
would provide elastic mode suppression and gust alleviation. Relaxed static 
stability would be used to get the most efficiency out of the advanced 
airfoil. Active CG management could be included to maximize fuel savings 
payoffs. Testing of the advanced wing with the S-3A ADFBW could take place 
in the late 1980's. 
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Two technologies that can be integrated with an advanced wing are the 
vortex-driven turbine and upper-surface blowing concepts. The vortex-driven 
turbine can be installed for vortex dissipation and power extraction. upper 
surface blowing is a technology for vectoring the thrust to increase 
circulation lift. 
Active flutter suppression is seen as the last active control entry 
because of its rapid and drastic failure modes. A first test application 
might be with flutter margin reduced to dive speed; then subsequent flutter 
margins could be eliminated to the point where flutter margins could be 
provided completely automatically. 
8.2.2 Flight Management and Air Traffic Control TechnologY 
Flight management and air traffic control technology are combined in 
figure 44. Today the component pieces of the future air traffic control 
system are being developed. In general, airborne avionics are leading the 
ground-based air traffic control system toward an era of fully automated, 
high-density flow management. As flight control becomes more automated the 
crew will function increasingly as system managers. The primary emphasis 
will be on efficient and safe flight in a crowded traffic environment, with 
elimination of delay and with optimal accommodation of changing weather 
situations. 
8.2.3 propulsion Control TechnologY 
Propulsion control as shown in figure 44 is heading inexorably toward 
full-authority digital engine control configurations. Digital engine control 
will provide opportunities for improved fuel efficiency and for the coupling 
of flight control and aircraft power systems. Gains for the relatively 
simple subsonic fanjet engine control will not be as impressive as those 
projected for transonic applications. 
8.2.4 Display TechnologY 
Electronic display technology will develop rapidly in the 1980s, 
culminating as shown in figure 44 with fully integrated, solid state 
flat-panel displays. The data volume available to the crew is almost 
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overwhelming today and will worsen with more widespread CRT usage in the 
cockpit of the near future. Much remains to be done in the area of human 
factors. NASA, recognizing this need, has initiated a substantial research 
and development effort in this area. Equally important, however, is the need 
for FEW-quality reliability in the displayed information. The advanced 
cockpit of the 1990's will be totally electronic. Its reliability must be 
equivalent to the electronic flight control because, as is the case with 
advanced flight controls, total loss of the displays could result in loss of 
the aircraft. Display technology then can directly benefit from ADFEW 
research efforts toward developing ultra-reliable digital equipment. 
8.2.5 Secondary Power Technology 
Secondary power systems will evolve in the 1980's and 1990's toward an 
all-electric implementation. Today's combination of electric, hydraulic, and 
pneumatic power has led to a proliferation of power sources and distribution 
systems, with a comparatively limited capability for load or function 
sharing. A two-phase evolution toward all-electric secondary power is 
anticipated. In the first, bleed power and pneumatic start systems will be 
eliminated. Engine starting and environmental control system power will be 
provided from a scaled-up electric power system. The second phase is more 
difficult; it involves the elimination of hydraulic power. All hydraulic 
motors and actuators will be replaced by electric-power devices. Hydraulic 
technology of today is as reliable as the structure of an aircraft. Many 
commercial transports are totally dependent on hydraulics for powering 
primary flight controls and other important systems. Emergent 
electromechanical actuators will have to be capable of equivalent reliability 
to replace hydraulic actuators in flight-critical applications. 
The ADFEW program plays an important role in the evolution of 
all-electric technology. In relation to the proposed study, two areas of 
research and development would be worthwhile. The first is the test and 
evaluation of electric primary surface actuators. The second is in the area 
of secondary power control. AS in the case of the advanced displays, the 
control of electric power for future all-electric aircraft will be dependent 
on ultra-reliable digital electronics. The all-electric flight control 
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system of the 1990's will use ring buses to efficiently distribute power to 
the electric motors and actuators on the aircraft. Remote-controlled, 
high-power solid state switches will control power to various parts of the 
aircraft. A total power failure cannot be tolerated; hence, FBW-quality 
digital control will again be a necessity. 
128 
APPENDIX A 
EXAMPLES OF FINITE-STATE ~mCHINES 
FOR SPECIFYING FLIGHT CONTROL FUNCTIONS* 
BACKGROUND 
In many cases designers attempt to write software directly from an English 
language definition of the problem. Therefore, most of the design decisions 
and algorithm steps get buried in the software, the correctness of which is 
dependent solely on the intuition and ingenuity of the programmer. This poses 
two problems. First, most of the current program proving techniques cannot be 
applied because they require a formal mathematical specification of what the 
program is supposed to do. Second, if the algorithm has a design error, it is 
very difficult to detect. 
We have proposed an approach that the algorithm be specified in terms of 
finite-state machine descriptions before writing the software so that the 
design decisions are made explicit and can be verified easily. 
The digital advanced avionic system (DAAS) flight control program showed 
that describing mode logic as a finite-state machine was very effective in 
making design decisions visible and preventing errors of omission. 
This appendix presents the details of three additional examples cited in 
section 3. The first example is an algorithm for selecting from three 
redundant sensor signals. It illustrates the use of a finite-state machine for 
exhibiting the structure of the algorithim. It also illustrates the dominance 
of one failure management mechanism over another. 
The second example describes a three-channel synchronization method. It 
shows the need for failure effects analysis of the auxiliary hardware as it 
interfaces with the software. 
*Portions of this research are supported by Honeywell IR&D programs. 
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The interaction between cross-channel voting and the testing of 
interchannel communications is studied in the third example. The study shows 
that three channels are adequate for detecting the first failure. 
These specific examples were chosen to illustrate finite-state machine 
modeling~ depending on final implementation of the ADFBW architecture, they 
mayor may not be part of the recommended system. 
SIGNAL SELECTION FOR THREE REDUNDANT SENSORS 
WITH VALIDITY FLAGS 
This algorithm provides an example of the finite-state structure. The 
description is intended to be precise, complete, and clear to allow a design 
review and a proof of correctness by a walk-through demonstration. 
A major part of this problem consists of combinational (nonsequential) 
logic. Mathematical (boolean) expressions of input variables have to be 
evaluated in order to determine the transitions of the finite-state machine. 
Similarly, mathematical expressions of input variables and the current state 
yield the output variables. In the three-sensor select problem, these 
mathematical expressions are of vital importance and strongly reflect the 
control engineering decisions. Therefore, it is essential that these 
expressions be explicitly derived and stated. 
Based on the above reasoning, the recommended approach is to have a 
complete mathematical description of the solution, which would serve as a 
specification for the software to be written. This mathematical description 
consists of a finite-state machine description and some boolean algebra in the 
following example. In a control law problem, it may consist of arithmetic 
expressions denoting, for example, the transfer function. 
The main advantage of a mathematical description is that it is a language 
easily understood by the control enginers. A systematically derived 
mathematical expression constitutes a proof in itself. It also highlights the 
control engineering decisions in the best possible manner. 
Another advantage is that once the mathematical description is written, 
hardware/software tradeoffs and implementation allocations can be readily made. 
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Note that this approach is quite compatible with the current program 
verification techniques. The required input and output assertions can be 
readily obtained from the mathematical description. The use of such 
techniques may not be necessary, however, because as experience indicates, 
most errors are made in obtaining the correct description of what the software 
is supposed to do. 
The entire process can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Control engineering statement of problem. - An English 
language statement of the problem, specifying the input and output variables. 
(2) Develop solution approach and informal algorithm(s) based on control 
engineering reasoning. 
(3) Mathematical description. -
(a) Identify what information has to be preserved 
from one cycle to another. This constitutes the 
finite-state machine. 
(b) Explicitly state which combinations of input 
variable cause a particular transition in the finite-state 
machine (this is based on control engineering decision). 
Complete the formal description of the finite-state machine. 
(c) Each output variable is a function of input 
variables and the current state of the finite-state 
machine. Describe this function mathematically, taking 
into account all possible states of the finite-state 
machine and all possible combinations of the input 
variables. 
(4) Hardware/software split. - Based on the results of the previous step, 
decide what portion is to be implemented in hardware and what in software. 
(5) Design and verify the hardware. 
(6) Design and verify the software. -
(a) Design software according to the specification in 
step 4. 
(b) Derive input-output assertion to be used for 
formal program verification. 
(c) Formally verify the program. 
(Steps band c may be omitted if not critical.) 
131 
Based on the above methodology, the remainder of this section presents a 
solution for the three-sensor select problem. 
A SOLUTION OF THE THREE-SENSOR SELECT PROBLEM 
Problem Statement 
To produce an output signal from three sensor signals with validity flags 
sampled at each cycle. 
Requirements and Approach 
The three sensor signals and the three corresponding validity flags are 
directly wired to each computer. If a flag is invalid, assume that the sensor 
has failed. There may, however, be failure modes not detected by the validity 
mechanism. Hence, signal comparisions are also necessary. The differences of 
the signals are required to be within a fixed tolerance that is specific to 
the sensor. 
The selection of the output depends only on the comparisons of the three 
signals. If the three signals are valid and compare within the tolerance, the 
median signal is chosen. If one pair of signals miscompare, the third signal 
is used but no fault is assigned. If two pairs of signals miscompare, then 
the signal common to the pairs is judged faulty and the average of the other 
two is taken as the selected signal. If there are three miscomparisons while 
all of the flags are valid or the situation is ambiguous, none of the data is 
used; the selected value from the previous cycle is chosen. 
To avoid nuisance error indications a counting mechanism is used to 
determine failure when a fixed plurality of miscompares is exceeded. A sensor 
will be considered to be recovered if it compares favorably for the same 
plurality of cycles. The status of the validity flag and the count of 
miscompares determines the state of the sensor. This part of the algorithm is 
represented as a finite-state machine. 
·Since there are two mechanisms for monitoring failures, these must be 
shown to provide consistent determinations under all circumstances~ It is 
conceivable, with time skew of the computer programs and momentary jitter in 
the flag signal, that the programs might disagree on the mode of failure, but 
this condition must not persist or allow differences in the selected signals. 
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Mathematical Description 
The information to be preserved from one cycle to another is the state of 
the counting mechanism and the sensor status (i.e., failed or OK). A 
finite-state machine representation of this will look like figure A-I. The 
total number of states is 2 Max + 1. Starting from state 1, the machine moves 
right one state every time sensor A is considered "bad." A transition to the 
left occurs every time sensor A is considered "good." In case of indecision, 
there is no transition. These states can also be represented by the values of 
integer variable count-A in the range Max to 1. When the value of count-A 
reaches zero, sensor A is considered in a failed state. The sensor is not 
considered recovered until count A reaches Max. The counting up mechanism is 
exactly the reverse of the counting down. 
In addition to the above, there are other transitions based on the value 
of the validity flag only. All the states of this finite-state machine 
transition to state "limbo" whenever sensor A validity flag (Afl) is false. 
The only exit from limbo is to the start-up state (state 1) when Afl is 
"true." Notice that whenever Afl becomes "false," it essentially resets the 
finite-state machine. It is important to note that conditions Afl, Abad, 
Agood, and Anutral should be mutually exclusive. Based on this finite-state 
machine description, sensor A is called in a failed state if it is in anyone 
of the following states: ALimbo, AstateMax+l, AstateMax+2, ••• , Astate2Max. A 
boolean "Afail" is generated to denote this condition. It is true if the 
finite-state machine for sensor A is in anyone of the above states. It is 
false otherwise. Booleans Bfail and Cfail are generated in a similar manner. 
Note that if Afl-false, it will always force Afail-true. There are similar, 
independent finite-state machines for sensor B and sensor C. 
The objective is to derive boolean expressions for conditions Abad, Agood, 
and Anutral. These expressions should contain as variable only the inputs and 
the current (unadvanced) states of the finite-state machines for the other two 
sensors. First, let us list the inputs and define some intermediate variables: 
a - real 
b - real 
c - real 
- value of sensor A 
- value of sensor B 
- value of sensor C 
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START 
AFl 
ASTATE 1 ASTATE 2 ASTATE MAX 
AFl 
ASTATE 2MAX • • • 
ANUTRAL 
ANUTRAL + ABAD 
AFAIL ~ (AUMBO ) + (ASTATE MAX+l) + (ASTATE MAX+2) +. • • • + (ASTATE 2 MAX) 
Figure A-i. - Finite-state machine for sensor A. 
Afl 
-
boolean - validity flag of sensor A 
Bfl 
-
boolean - validity flag of sensor B 
eEl - boolean - validity flag of sensor C 
A3 boolean - True: ASS (a-b) < Toleranoe 
AC boolean - True: ABS(a-o) < Tolerance 
BC boolean - True: ASS (b-c) < Tolerance 
A truth table is given in table A-I. The expressions for Abad, Agood, and 
Anutral are directly obtained from this table. 
Abad: Boolean; should be true when Afl-true and there is 
sufficient reason to believe that sensor A is bad. 
Abad = Afl {Bfl • Cfl • AC • Cfailp + Bfl • Cfl • AB • 
Bfailp + Bfl • Cfl • AB • AC • (BC + BC • 
Bfailp • Cfailp)} 
Agood: Boolean; true whenever there is sufficient reason 
to believe that sensor A is good and Afl-true. 
Agood = Afl {Bfl· Cfl + Bfl • AC + Cfl • AB + 
Bfl • Cfl • (AS • BC + AC • BC + AB • BC • AC)} 
Anutral: Boolean; true whenever there is insufficient 
reason for either Agood-true or Abad-true. 
Anutral = Afl • Agood • Bgood 
Afailp: Value of Afail at the end of previous cycle. 
Bfailp: Value of Bfail at the end of previous cycle. 
Similar expressions can be obtained for Bgood, Bbad, and Bnutral; and 
Cgood, Cbad, and Cnutral. This completes the finite-state machine 
descriptions. Note that if the three finite-state machines are advanced 
simultaneously, there is no need to define Afailp, Bfailp, and Cfailp. This 
is standard practice in hardware implementations of finite-state machines. 
There are two outputs: 
Sensor-type-fails. - Boolean; true when there is sufficient reason to 
believe that all the three sensors have failed, or it cannot be known which 
sensor is good. 
sensor-type-fail - Afail Bfail Cfai1 
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TABLE A-I. - TRUTH TABLE FOR AGOOD, ABAD, AND ANUTRAL 
Inputs: Afl, Bfl, Cfl, AB, BC, AC, Bfailp, and Cfailp 
I. Afl-true 
Bfl Cfl AB BC AC Agood Abad 
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 1 1 0 
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 
0 1 0 0 0 0 Cfailp 
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 
0 1 0 1 0 0 Cfailp 
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 
0 1 1 0 0 0 Cfailp 
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 
0 1 1 1 0 0 Cfailp 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Cfailp ~ value of Cfail at end of previous cycle 
Bfailp ~ value of Bfail at end of previous cycle 
Anutral 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Cfailp 
0 
Cfail 
0 
Cfail 
0 
Cfail 
0 
TABLE A-l. - Concluded 
Sfl Cfl AS SC AC 
1 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1 
1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 1 1 
1 0 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 1 
1 0 1 1 0 
1 0 1 1 1 
1 1 0 0 0 
1 1 0 0 1 
1 1 0 1 0 
1 1 0 1 1 
1 1 1 0 0 
1 1 1 0 1 
1 1 1 1 0 
1 1 1 1 1 
N = Bfail • Cfail 
II. Afl-false 
Agood = Abad = Anutral = false 
regardless of other inputs 
Agood 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
Abad Anutral 
Sfailp Bfailp 
Bfailp Bfailp 
Bfailp Bfailp 
Sfailp Bfailp 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
-N N 
0 0 
1 0 
0 1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 1 
0 0 
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Selected-value. - Real: denotes the selected signal value for this cycle. 
The following variables are used as inputs: 
Afail, Bfail, Cfail, AB, BC, AC, a, b, c, past-value 
Table A-2 gives the selected-value for all possible combinations of the 
input variables. It can be easily verified that the eight boolean conditions 
are indeed mutually exclusive and that they account for all possible (64) 
combinations of the six input booleans., 
Hardware-Software Split 
There are various options available here, as listed below: 
(a) The entire algorithm can be implemented in hardware. This will be a 
very straightforward but tedious design. 
(b) Part of the algorithm can be implemented in hardware, such as 
evaluating the booleans AB, BC, AC, or the finite-state machines. 
(c) The entire algorithm can be implemented in software. 
For the purpose of an example, the third approach is used here. The 
algorithm steps are: 
(1) Evaluate any intermediate variables. 
(2) Process data for sensor A (i.e., advance finite-state machine) • 
(3) Process data for sensor B. 
(4) Process data for sensor C. 
(5) Evaluate outputs. 
The next step in developing software for this function would be to prepare 
the HIPO charts from the finite-state machine description. 
Verification 
A walk-through of the algorithm can be used to show that, as a single 
computer program, it is technically correct. The compare and select functions 
are not complicated so their implementations can be tested for all 
combinations of boolean inputs and a reasonable representation of the 
combinations of real inputs. 
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TABLE A-2. - GENERATING OUTPUT VARIABLES. 
Condition selected-Value 
l. Afail· 
· 
Bfail 
· 
Cfail 
· 
AB . BC . AC = true median (a, b, c) 
- -2. Bfail 
· 
Cfail • (Afail • BC + Afail 
· 
AB • BC 
· 
AC) = true b + c 
2 
- -Afail Cfail + Bfail 3. 
· · 
(Bfail 
· 
AC 
· 
AB 
· 
BC 
· 
AC) = true a + C 
---
2 
-4. Mail 
· 
Bfail 
· 
(Cfail 
· 
AB + Cfail 
· 
AB 
· 
BC • AC) = true a + b 
---
2 
--- -- --- -- -5. Afail • (Bfail • Cfail + Bfail 
· 
Cfail • AB 
· 
BC 
· 
AC) = true a 
--- -6. Bfail 
· 
(Afail • Cfail + Afail • Cfail • AB • BC • AC) = true b 
--- --- -- -7. Cfail 
· 
(Afail 
· 
Bfail + Afail 
· 
Bfail 
· 
AB 
· 
BC • AC) = true c 
- - -8. Afail 
· 
Bfail 
· 
Cfail + Afail . Bfail . Cfail . AB • BC • AC + 
--- -Afail • Bfail • Cfail 
· 
BC + Afail . Bfail • Cfail • AC + 
-- --- -Afail 
· 
Bfail • Cfail 
· 
AB past-value 
ANALYSIS OF A THREE-CHANNEL SYNCHRONIZATION MECHANISM 
One approach to frame synchronization is to, use dedicated hardware, 
external to the computers, to provide signals to simultaneously release the 
computers from the halt instruction in each copy of the software. These 
schemes require very careful failure modes and effects analysis to show that 
no single failure in this external hardware or in the computers results in 
total system failure. 
The Configuration 
The configuration for synchronization is shown in figure A-2. Each block 
of hardware communicates with the two other blocks and its respective 
computer. In addition, there is a flip-flop which is set by the local 
computer program when its execution leaves the initialization phase. This 
flip-flop may be read by the other computers. The corresponding boolean 
variables are called the right_up_and_ready, local_up_and_ready, and left_up 
and_ready to distinguish them from the ready signals available from the 
hardware logic shown in figure A-3. 
After the hardware is reset, the real-time counter counts for 25 msec and 
sets the ready flip-flop. If the counting continues through the overcount 
period, the overcount flip-flop is set. The hardware produces the halt 
release signal from the following two terms, which are combined at the final 
or-gate. For two or three computers, 
halt_release = «left_overcount AND local-overcount) OR right_ready) 
AND «right_overcount AND local_overcount) OR left_ready) 
AND local_ready 
But to provide for the case in which two computers fail, we need the term 
halt release = «NOT left_overcount OR 
NOT local_overcount) AND NOT right_ready) 
AND «NOT right_overcount OR 
NOT Local_overcount) AND NOT Left_ready) 
AND local overcount 
The hardware is implemented so that the power-down or broken wire case appears 
as ready = true and overcount = true to the other channels. 
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REAL- TIME 
CLOCK 
LOCAL SYNCH 
HARDHARE 
LOCAL 
COMPUTER 
EXTERN/l,L 
LOCAL up-AND-
READY FLIP-FLOP 
Figure A-2. - Configuration for synchronization. 
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CLOCK 
OVERCOUNT FROM 
LEFT HARDWARE 
.---____ S-I OVER-
o 
OVER-COUNT 
DETECTOR 
REAL- TIME 
COUNTER 
R COUNT 
FF 
I--f_S-i READY 
FF 
R ~_---' 
o 
RESET LEFT 
OVERCOUNT FF 
LEFT 
R VER-
READY SIGNAL FROM 
RIGHT HARDWARE 
S COUNT 0 
1-_--1 FF 1----/ 
LOCAL OVERCOUNT 
LOCAL READY -SIGNAL 
RIGHT 
)----1 OVER-
RESET SYNCHRONIZATION HARDWARE 
COUNT 
FF 
OVERCOUNT FROM RESET RIGHT 
RIGHT HARDWARE OVERCOUNT FF 
READY SIGNAL FROM 
LEFT HARDWARE 
Figure A-3. - Hardware logic for synchronization. 
HALT 
RELEASE 
Initial synchronization 
The process of initially synchronizing with a computer that is already 
running in the frame is illustrated in figure A-4. If the right or left 
computers are already running, they have passed the instruction in the initial 
leg of the program that sets the up_and_ready flip-flop. The local computer 
detects that this flip-flop is set and waits in the starting leg until the 
running computer passes the halt and resets the ready flip-flop in the 
synchronizing hardware. This is detected in the wait loop and the local 
computer is released. The time required for the program to run from the ready 
reset to the beginning of the loop is balanced to maintain the synchronization. 
Analysis of Frame Synchronization 
The auxiliary hardware has three states that are defined by the ready and 
ovecount flip-flops. These are: 
(1) NOT ready AND NOT overcount (the program is in the 25 ~sec main 
program loop) 
(2) Ready AND NOT overcount (the clock has timed past 25 ~seci normally 
the program is at halt, waiting for the other ready's. 
START 
HALT 
LOCAL HARDWARE READ 
SET BY THE CLOCK 
LOCAL HARDWARE 
READY RESET BY TH 
PROGRAM 
BEGIN LOOP 
WAIT FOR LEFT OR 
RIGHT HARDWARE 
READY TO BE RESET 
LOCAL UP AND READY SET 
BOTH IN THE SOFTWARE AND 
IN THE HARDWARE 
MAIN BODY 
OF PROGRAM 
Figure A-4. - Initial synchronization. 
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(3) Ready AND overcount (the clock has counted past the overcount period 
and has set the overcount flip-flop.) 
The parallel operation of the computer and the auxiliary hardware is 
illustrated by the Petri net diagram in figure A-S. It represents the 
operation of the local computer with the right computer; the left computer is 
not turned on. Places PI to P3 with transitions Tl to T3 represent 
the operation of the local clock. Places P4 and Ps with transitions T3 
and T4 are the states of overcount flip-flop. Places P6 and P7 with 
transitions TS and T6 are the states of the ready flip-flop. Transition 
T6 represents the halt-release logic of 
halt-release = local-ready AND (right-ready OR 
local-overcount) 
. The local computer is at halt in place PlO but is running and crosses the 
reset command in the software at transition TIl. 
Three events govern the operation of the computer: 
(1) Halt release is issued, ready and overcount flip-flops are reset, 
clock is reset 
(2) Clock sets ready flip-flop 
(3) Clock sets overcount flip-flop 
Thus, there are trivial relations between the events and the states. These 
are shown in table A-3 and represent the 27 states of the three computers. 
This table merely confirms the consistency of the operation and defines the 
states in which a release command is output. If only computers A and Bare 
operating, C reports that it is in the state ready AND overcount. This limits 
the operation of the system to the states and transitions shown in table A-4. 
With only one computer operating, there are only the three remaining states, 
illustrated in table A-S. 
The release-enable output listed in the last column of the tables may be 
represented by 
release a enable = [ a(l) AND NOT [b(O) OR 
c(O)]] OR [a(2) AND 
NOT [(b(O) AND c(l» OR 
( b ( 1 ) AND c ( 0) ) ] ] 
This can be verified to be equivalent to the boolean logic of the hardware 
list;.d-previously. 
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i 
OVERCOUNT 
PERIOD 
ELAPSED 
25 USEe 
PERIOD 
ELAPSED 
CLOCK PAST 
OVERCOUNT 
PERIOD 
CLOCK IN 
25 USEC 
PERIOD 
.. -. '. - .... ~ 
RIGHT-READY 
SET RELEASE 
LOCAL OVERCOUNTL-__ -. ... 
FLIP-FLOP SET + 
-~,.-oL- SOFH1ARE RESET 
Figure A-5. - Petri net for local computer. 
. :.....JL--~~ __ RESET COMl·IAND 
SOFTHARE 
RESET 
SIGNAL 
TABLE A-3. - ALL THREE COMPUTER GUIDES 
~ .. .. ... 'tl C 'tl C 'tl c: State C1> :J C1> :J C1> ::l 
'" 
0 
'" 
0 
'" 
0 
to >. u to >. u to >. u C1>'tl NOT Ready l. Ready 2. Ready C1> 'tl ... C1> 'tl ... C1> 'tl ... '" OJ 
.... to C1> .... to C1> .... .. \I) .. .... \I) \I) > CII II! > \I) \I) > \1)..0 NOT Overcount e>: e>: 0 a:: e>: 0 e>: a: 0 ...... \I) c: 
..: ..: ..: III III ttl tJ tJ tJ ",ru Overcount 
a ABC - 5 - - 4 - - J -
1 ABC 12 - 17 13 - 16 14 - 15 A B C 
2 ABC 9 - - 10 - - 11 - - AB C 
3 A B C - 13 - - 12 - a - 6 
4 A C B - 14 - a - 7 - lZ -
5 B C A a - 8 - .14 - - lJ -
6 A B C - 23 - - 21 - a - - C 
7 A C B 
-
25 
-
0 
- - -
ZZ 
-
B 
8 B C A 0 
- - -
26 - - 24 - A 
9 A B C 
-
18 
-
6 
- -
7 
- -
B C 
10 B A C 6 - - - 19 - 8 - - A C 
11 C A B 7 - - 8 - - - za - AB 
12 A B C 
-
1 
-
3 - 22 4 - Zl. 
13 B A C 3 - 24 - 1 - 13 - ZJ 
14 C A B 4 
-
26 5 
-
25 - 1 -
15 A B C 21 - 19 23 - 18 14 - - ABC 
16 A C B 22 - 20 13 - - 25 - HI ABC 
17 B C A 12 - - 24 - 20 26 - U AB C 
18 A B C 9 
-
2 23 
- -
25 
- -
AB C 
19 B A C 21 - - 10 - 2 26 - - ABC 
20 C A B 22 
- -
24 
- -
11 
-
Z ABC 
21 A B C - 15 - 6 - 9 4 - -
22 A C B - 16 - 3 - - 7 - g 
23 B A C 6 - 10 - 15 - 5 - -
24 B C A 3 
- - -
17 
-
8 
-
La 
25 C A B 7 - 11 5 - - - 16 -
26 C B A 4 
- -
8 
- 11 - 17 -
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TABLE A-4. - COMPUTERS A AND B OPERATING 
.... .... '-' 
'0 C '0 C '0 c Stat'? 
" " 
CJ 
" 
CJ 
" Ul 0 til 0 Ul 0 
'" 
:>. u 
'" 
:>. u 
'" 
:>. u OJ '0 
~OT Ready l. Ready 2. Ready CJ '0 ... <II '0 ... <II 'tl ... til CJ 
.... 
'" 
<II .... 
'" 
<II .... 
'" 
<II '" .... 
<II CJ > <II <II > <II <II > <11.0 !lOT Overcount a: a: 0 a: a: 0 a: a: 0 .... '" CJ C 
<t <t <t al al al U U U a: ~ Overcount 
0 
1 
2 ABC 9 - - 10 - - 11 - - A 8 C 
3 
4 
5 
6 ,\ 9 C - 23 - - 21 - 0 - - C 
7 
8 
9 A B C - 18 - 6 - - 7 - - B C 
10 8 A C 6 - - - 19 - 8 - - A C 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 A B C 21 - 19 23 - 18 14 - - ABC 
16 
17 
18 A 8 C 9 - 2 23 - - 25 - - ABC 
19 8 A C 21 - - 10 - 2 26 - - ABC 
20 
21 A B C - 15 - 6 - 9 4 - -
22 
23 8 A C 6 - 10 - 15 - 5 - -
24 
25 
26 
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TABLE A-5. - COMPUTER A OPERATING 
~ '"' '"' '"' State '0 <: '0 <: '0 <: ., 
" 
<:I 
" " 
:J 
'" 
0 
'" 
c 
" 
0 
NOT Ready l. Ready 2. Ready .. ,., ~ .. ,., ~ '" >- ;; 
:; "'J 
.,
'0 ., 'g ~ -g " " .... .. ., .... <:I 
" 
"' .... 
NOT Over<:ount <:I " 
> ., 
'" 
> 
'" 
<:I > c: ..c 
a: c: 0 a: c: 0 c: a: 0 ..... '" 
<:I <: 
Overcount .,; .,; <: OJ ::J ::J '-J '-J U ",:.J 
0 
1 
2 ABC 9 - - 10 - - 11 - - ABC 
) 
4 
5 
6 
7 
H 
4 II B C - 18 - 6 - - 7 - - B C 
10 I 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 A B C 9 - 2 23 - - 25 - - ABC 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
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The Results 
By this analysis, we have verified the consistency of the synchronization 
scheme for all states and all events and have verified the release logic 
equations. The next step is to study the failure effects of the auxiliary 
hardware to show that there are no single failures which will cause a 
persistent unsynchronized condition or will cause the system to fail by some 
other response. These results are not reported here. 
CROSS-CHANNEL VOTING AND TESTING OF INTERCHANNEL COMMUNICATIONS 
This study describes the interchannel communication typical of a 
frame-synchronized triplex system (ref. Al). The configuration is shown in 
figure A-6. Each computer communicates to the others through a single 
transmitter, which sends the same signals to receivers at each of the other 
computers. Thus, the sending computer-transmitter cannot originate two 
different signals. Asymmetry in the communications can be caused only by 
errors in the receivers or the receiving computer. This approach eliminates 
the concerns raised in reference A2, which is carried needlessly into SIFT 
(ref. A3 to A6). According to reference 2, we need four computers to detect 
one error if the originating computer sends differing signals to the others. 
This is not the case for the configuration shown in figure A-6. 
The Analysis 
The approach is by brute force. Assume that anyone of the 12 boxes in 
figure A-6 produces errors and then follow these errors through two levels of 
data exchange. Only one unit is assumed faulty. Errors are detected by a sum 
check on the data transmissions and by comparisons of computer outputs from 
some ,active computation. The error syndromes after the initial data exchange 
are listed in table A-6~ the final syndromes resulting from the exchange of 
the initial observations are shown in table A-7. After the first exchange the 
syndromes allow a computer to detect errors in the foreign computers or the 
communications channels, but cannot distinguish between errors in the 
computers, transmitters, or receivers. After the second round of data 
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Figure A-6. - Communication among synchronized channels. 
interchange, the syndromes distinguish receiver errors and 
computer-transmitter errors; the local computer, if okay, can determine that 
its transmitter is causing errors. 
In the second round of communications, a computer will receive a word that 
indicates an error in the left or right path, or its own transmitter. The 
. 
transmission over an erroneous path is indicated by an X in table A-7. 
The algorithm is summarized in table A-B. There is a jump in the frame of 
reference from the initial observation to the final analysis in table A-6; if 
the right channel decides that its left channel is in error, then the local 
channel will interpret this decision to mean that it is in error. 
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APPENDIX B 
SAHPLE IRON BIRD TEST PLAN 
INTRODUCTION 
A sample test plan to validate the advanced digital fly-by-wire (ADFBW) in 
the S-3A iron bird is given in this appendix. The sample plan is used to 
illustrate the typical test procedures and to identify those tasks for which 
automation is essential for validating flight-critical digital systems and 
beneficial in reducing test time and cost. To illustrate the potential test 
time savings of the automated iron bird, test times are estimated for both the 
manual approach and the automated approach based on the same number of test 
cases to be conducted. 
TEST DESCRIPTION AND TEST TIME ESTIMATION 
The iron bird testing will be conducted in two phases. The two phases are 
defined as follows: 
(1) Phase A. Phase A will test the ADFBW system's hardware and software 
open-loop performance. Aircraft dynamics will not be included. The purposes 
of this test phase are to: 
o Demonstrate compatibility among ADFBW systems and with 
aircraft interfacing systems 
o Verify static gains between stick/pedal and control surfaces 
o Verify system software 
(2). Phase B. The tests conducted during this phase will evaluate the 
ADFBW closed-loop performance. Closed-loop testing will be accomplished with 
simulated aircraft dynamics. Testing with pilot-in-the-loop is possible by 
driving flight instruments with simulated aircraft response variables. The 
purposes of this test phase are to: 
(1) Validate the analytically predicted stability of the augmentation 
mode 
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(2) Validate the fault-tolerance performance of the system 
(3) Eliminate infant-mortality type failures by an accelerated life 
test procedure 
(4) Evaluate handling qualities for normal and degraded modes 
operation by pilots 
Phase A--Open-Loop Tests 
Three tasks are identified in this phase: system interface test, 
static gain test, and software validation. 
System interface test. - This test will be performed to verify that 
all subsystems are interfaced properly. The test procedure will include 
setting electrical and hydraulic power supplies at various loading levels 
and permissible limits to verify that the ADFBW system's performance wiil 
not result in undesirable or unsatisfactory operation. Because of the 
high degree of manual interpretation on the operational status of the 
system and the small number of test cases involved, a manual approach to 
carry out the test procedures will be adequate. The total test time to 
complete this task is estimated to be 80 hours. 
Static gain test. - The static gain tests are performed to verify and 
evaluate the following: 
(1) End-to-end gains--the degree of surface output per pound of 
control stick/pedal input 
(2) Nonlinear effects such as hysteresis, deadband, and saturation 
(3) Gain scheduling 
All control axes will be evaluated. The procedure will include applying 
step inputs at control stick-pedal to evaluate end-to-end gains, applying 
function generator at different amplitudes to evaluate nonlinear effects, and 
setting airspeed at different levels for evaluation of gain scheduling. 
A total of 100 test cases are estimated. The test times are estimated at 
50 hours for manual operation and 16 hours for automated operation. 
Software validation. - Redundancy management and control modes switching 
logic functions which are modeled by the finite-state machine can be 
validated in the iron bird by inserting hardware events into the software 
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structure to verify that all state transitions and outputs of all states are 
correct. For software that performs data transformation functions (e.g., 
control law and filter computation) which are not modeled by the finite-state 
machine, the software can be validated by frequency response and open-loop 
static gain tests in the iron bird. Since the volume of test cases for this 
task is quite high, automation is essential. The number of test cases and 
test times are estimated as summarized in table B-1. 
Phase B--Closed-Loop Tests 
Four tasks are identified in this phase: stability test, fault tolerance 
test, accelerated life test, and pilot-in-the-loop test. 
Stability tests. - The stability performance of the augmentation mode as 
predicted by analyses will be validated in this test. Actual hardware such 
as sensors, electronics, and actuators will be included on the iron bird to 
eliminate error included in the analytical predictions owing to 
nonlinearities and other math modeling problems associated with these 
components. The typical test procedures will include the following: 
TABLE B-1. - SOFTWARE VALIDATION TEST TIMES ESTIMATION 
_. 
Estimated Estimated Test Time 
Software No. of 
Function Test Cases Automated Manual Method 
Control mode 500 4 hours 125 hours Finite-state machine 
logic 
Redundancy 2000 16 hours 500 hours Finite-state machine 
management 
Control laws 300 8 hours 15 hours Frequency response 
and static gain 
Total 28 hours 640 hours 
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(1) Time response. - Apply steps and doublets into the control stick/ 
pedal to observe short period and phugoid modes of the closed-loop system 
(2) Frequency response. - Evaluate phase and gain margins by 
applying a sine wave into the open-loop system 
(3) Closed-loop system damping. - Apply a sine wave at a frequency 
equal to the closed-loop phugoid and short period frequencies to observe 
system damping. 
The number of test cases is based on the combination of flight conditions and 
number of frequency points, which are estimated to be on the order of 300 
cases. Total test times estimated for this task are 60 hours for automated 
testing and 120 hours for manual testing. 
Fault tolerance test. - The fault tolerance test is conducted by inserting 
multiple hardware faults into the system. Test cases will be designed based 
on the fault-tree of the system. The purpose of this test is to verify the 
fault-tree topology of the system which is used to predict the system's 
reliability. The ADFBW system's fault detection, reconfiguration, and 
annunciation features will be demonstrated. The ability of the system to 
operate under the fault conditions with no adverse transients will also be 
demonstrated. 
Because of the complexity of the fault-tree structure and the importance 
of this test to validate the ultra-reliability requirement, a large number of 
fault combinations will be evaluated. A total of 20 000 fault combinations is 
estimated. Assuming 30 seconds per test case using automation, the total test 
time will be on the order of 170 hours. If automation is not available, the 
total test time will be on the order of 5000 hours. 
Accelerated life test. - The purposes of the accelerated life test are to: 
(1) Validate system performance 
(2) Perform system fatigue tests 
·(3) Monitor component reliability 
(4) Identify and eliminate design and implementation errors which 
are major contributors of system unreliability 
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All maneuver profiles, together with combinations of aircraft 
conditions and environments, will be evaluated. To compress the total 
t~st time, extreme environmental stressors \~ill be applied to various 
sUbsystems to induce actual failures. All test cases will be repeated 
~nd cycled to induce fatigue type failures. A high degree of automation, 
such as the use of a robotic system to operate the aircraft in the iron 
bird, is required for this task. 
A total of 200 test cases is estimated. These test cases will be 
repeated and cycled until a high degree of confidence is obtained that 
the system is free of design and implementation errors. The total test 
time for this task is estimated to be on the order of 1000 hours. 
Pilot-in-the-loop test. - Normal and failure modes operation of the 
system will be used to demonstrate the handling qualities of airplanes 
with the ADFBW system and the augmentation mode engaged. The output data 
from each test will include pilot ratings and comments on the workload 
required to obtain satisfactory aircraft performance for the normal and 
degraded modes. The clarity and adequacy of fault annunciation will also 
be evaluated. 
The total test time estimated for this task is 160 hours. No 
automation is required for this task. 
SUMMARY 
The total iron bird test times to validate the ADFBW system are 
summarized in table B-2. It can be shown that automation will offer 
substantial savings in test times. Using the recommended automated test 
plan, the total test time to validate the ADFBW system is estimated to be 
1548 hours. The equivalent test time to perform the total test program 
manually is estimated to be 7100 hours. 
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TABLE B-2. - TEST TIMES SUMMARY 
Estimated Test Time 
Test Task Manual Automated (hours) 
Manual Automated 
Phase A - Open loop 
0 System interface X 80 80 
0 Static gain X 100 50 
0 Software validation X 640 28 
Phase B - Closed loop 
0 Stability test X 120 60 
0 Fault tolerance test X 5000 170 
0 Accelerated life test X 1000 1000 
0 Pilot-in-the-loop test X 160 160 
7100 1548 
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